mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

A Survey of Decision Making in Adversarial Games

arXiv 2207.07971 ↗First posted 16 Jul 2022cs.GT cs.AIcited by 3

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Abstract (arXiv)

Game theory has by now found numerous applications in various fields, including economics, industry, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence, where each player only cares about its own interest in a noncooperative or cooperative manner, but without obvious malice to other players. However, in many practical applications, such as poker, chess, evader pursuing, drug interdiction, coast guard, cyber-security, and national defense, players often have apparently adversarial stances, that is, selfish actions of each player inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players. Along this line, this paper provides a systematic survey on three main game models widely employed in adversarial games, i.e., zero-sum normal-form and extensive-form games, Stackelberg (security) games, zero-sum differential games, from an array of perspectives, including basic knowledge of game models, (approximate) equilibrium concepts, problem classifications, research frontiers, (approximate) optimal strategy seeking techniques, prevailing algorithms, and practical applications. Finally, promising future research directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 122 of its 312 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Jul 2022.

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122 of 312 references.

References · 122

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38 more
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Citing papers per year: 2022: 1; 2023: 0; 2024: 1; 2025: 1.

3 papers.