Abstracting Imperfect Information Away from Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
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Abstract (arXiv)
In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.
Key facts. Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 29 of its 67 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 22 Jan 2023.
Builds on
29 of 67 references.
References · 29
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- 2022A Unified Approach to Reinforcement Learning, Quantal Response Equilibria, and Two-Player Zero-Sum Gamescited by 64
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- 2019Improving Policies via Search in Cooperative Partially Observable Gamescited by 33
17 more
- 2013Solving Imperfect Information Games Using Decompositioncited by 27
- 2018Depth-Limited Solving for Imperfect-Information Gamescited by 24
- 2021Scalable Online Planning via Reinforcement Learning Fine-Tuningcited by 18
- 2022Regularized Gradient Descent Ascent for Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Gamescited by 18
- 2021Solving Common-Payoff Games with Approximate Policy Iterationcited by 15
- 2020Unlocking the Potential of Deep Counterfactual Value Networkscited by 8
- 2021Common Information based Approximate State Representations in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learningcited by 8
- 2022HSVI can solve zero-sum Partially Observable Stochastic Gamescited by 8
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2023: 2; 2024: 1; 2025: 2; 2026: 1.
6 papers.
- 2023Suspicion-Agent: Playing Imperfect Information Games with Theory of Mind Aware GPT-4cited by 67
- 2025Scalable Decision Making for Games of Imperfect Informationcited by 7
- 2026Detecting Multi-Agent Collusion Through Multi-Agent Interpretabilitycited by 6
- 2023The Update-Equivalence Framework for Decision-Time Planningcited by 2
- 2025Look-ahead Reasoning with a Learned Model in Imperfect Information Gamescited by 1
- 2024ε-Optimally Solving Zero-Sum POSGscited by 0
- 2026Detecting Multi-Agent Collusion Through Multi-Agent Interpretability1 Apr 2026
- 2025Scalable Decision Making for Games of Imperfect Information10 Nov 2025
- 2025Look-ahead Reasoning with a Learned Model in Imperfect Information Games6 Oct 2025
- 2024ε-Optimally Solving Zero-Sum POSGs29 May 2024
- 2023Suspicion-Agent: Playing Imperfect Information Games with Theory of Mind Aware GPT-429 Sep 2023
- 2023The Update-Equivalence Framework for Decision-Time Planning25 Apr 2023