mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments

arXiv 2505.21936 ↗First posted 28 May 2025cs.CLcited by 46

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)

Computer-use agents (CUAs) promise to automate complex tasks across operating systems (OS) and the web, but remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Current evaluations of this threat either lack support realistic but controlled environments or ignore hybrid web-OS attack scenarios involving both interfaces. To address this, we propose RedTeamCUA, an adversarial testing framework featuring a novel hybrid sandbox that integrates a VM-based OS environment with Docker-based web platforms. Our sandbox supports key features tailored for red teaming, such as flexible adversarial scenario configuration, and a setting that decouples adversarial evaluation from navigational limitations of CUAs by initializing tests directly at the point of an adversarial injection. Using RedTeamCUA, we develop RTC-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark with 864 examples that investigate realistic, hybrid web-OS attack scenarios and fundamental security vulnerabilities. Benchmarking current frontier CUAs identifies significant vulnerabilities: Claude 3.7 Sonnet | CUA demonstrates an ASR of 42.9%, while Operator, the most secure CUA evaluated, still exhibits an ASR of 7.6%. Notably, CUAs often attempt to execute adversarial tasks with an Attempt Rate as high as 92.5%, although failing to complete them due to capability limitations. Nevertheless, we observe concerning high ASRs in realistic end-to-end settings, with the strongest-to-date Claude 4.5 Sonnet | CUA exhibiting the highest ASR of 60%, indicating that CUA threats can already result in tangible risks to users and computer systems. Overall, RedTeamCUA provides an essential framework for advancing realistic, controlled, and systematic analysis of CUA vulnerabilities, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses to indirect prompt injection prior to real-world deployment.

Key facts. Cited by 46 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 38 of its 61 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 May 2025.

Builds on

38 of 61 references.

Closest ancestors · 16

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025LlamaFirewall: An open source guardrail system for building secure AI agents6 May
  2. 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
  3. 2025DoomArena: A framework for Testing AI Agents Against Evolving Security Threats18 Apr
  4. 2025The Obvious Invisible Threat: LLM-Powered GUI Agents' Vulnerability to Fine-Print Injections15 Apr
  5. 2025SafeArena: Evaluating the Safety of Autonomous Web Agents6 Mar
  6. 2025AGrail: A Lifelong Agent Guardrail with Effective and Adaptive Safety Detection17 Feb
  7. 2025Commercial LLM Agents Are Already Vulnerable to Simple Yet Dangerous Attacks12 Feb
  8. 2024Attacking Vision-Language Computer Agents via Pop-ups4 Nov
  9. 2024AdvAgent: Controllable Blackbox Red-teaming on Web Agents22 Oct
  10. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
  11. 2024ST-WebAgentBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating Safety and Trustworthiness in Web Agents9 Oct
  12. 2024EIA: Environmental Injection Attack on Generalist Web Agents for Privacy Leakage17 Sep
4 more
  1. 2024Dissecting Adversarial Robustness of Multimodal LM Agents18 Jun
  2. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
  3. 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents18 Jan
  4. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 22

  1. 2024GPT-4o System Cardcited by 4,588
  2. 2023WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agentscited by 2,006
  3. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
  4. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
  5. 2022WebShop: Towards Scalable Real-World Web Interaction with Grounded Language Agentscited by 1,251
  6. 2023Mind2Web: Towards a Generalist Agent for the Webcited by 1,242
  7. 2024OSWorld: Benchmarking Multimodal Agents for Open-Ended Tasks in Real Computer Environmentscited by 1,195
  8. 2025UI-TARS: Pioneering Automated GUI Interaction with Native Agentscited by 610
  9. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 493
  10. 2024Navigating the Digital World as Humans Do: Universal Visual Grounding for GUI Agentscited by 382
  11. 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 375
  12. 2024TheAgentCompany: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Consequential Real World Taskscited by 326
10 more
  1. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 267
  2. 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 264
  3. 2024Windows Agent Arena: Evaluating Multi-Modal OS Agents at Scalecited by 223
  4. 2024The BrowserGym Ecosystem for Web Agent Researchcited by 161
  5. 2025Agent S2: A Compositional Generalist-Specialist Framework for Computer Use Agentscited by 159
  6. 2025GuardReasoner: Towards Reasoning-based LLM Safeguardscited by 100
  7. 2024Can LLMs Separate Instructions From Data? And What Do We Even Mean By That?cited by 81
  8. 2025REAL: Benchmarking Autonomous Agents on Deterministic Simulations of Real Websitescited by 45
  9. 2024HAICOSYSTEM: An Ecosystem for Sandboxing Safety Risks in Human-AI Interactionscited by 44
  10. 2024InjecGuard: Benchmarking and Mitigating Over-defense in Prompt Injection Guardrail Modelscited by 42

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 10; 2026: 36.

46 papers.

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By area:

  1. 2025Magentic-UI: Towards Human-in-the-loop Agentic Systemscited by 43
  2. 2025Defending Against Prompt Injection with DataFiltercited by 35
  3. 2026Unsafer in Many Turns: Benchmarking and Defending Multi-Turn Safety Risks in Tool-Using Agentscited by 30
  4. 2026Poison Once, Exploit Forever: Environment-Injected Memory Poisoning Attacks on Web Agentscited by 24
  5. 2025MLA-Trust: Benchmarking Trustworthiness of Multimodal LLM Agents in GUI Environmentscited by 23
  6. 2025WebGuard: Building a Generalizable Guardrail for Web Agentscited by 21
  7. 2025Build the web for agents, not agents for the webcited by 18
  8. 2025FocusAgent: Simple Yet Effective Ways of Trimming the Large Context of Web Agentscited by 16
  9. 2026DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap): A Controllable and Interactive Red-Teaming Platform for AI Agentscited by 13
  10. 2026The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agentscited by 12
  11. 2025Just Do It!? Computer-Use Agents Exhibit Blind Goal-Directednesscited by 9
  12. 2025RedCodeAgent: Automatic Red-teaming Agent against Diverse Code Agentscited by 9
34 more
  1. 2026LPS-Bench: Benchmarking Safety Awareness of Computer-Use Agents in Long-Horizon Planning under Benign and Adversarial Scenarioscited by 9
  2. 2026When Actions Go Off-Task: Detecting and Correcting Misaligned Actions in Computer-Use Agentscited by 8
  3. 2026Qwen-CUA: Native Computer Use for (almost) Everythingcited by 8
  4. 2025Graph2Eval: Automatic Multimodal Task Generation for Agents via Knowledge Graphscited by 7
  5. 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 7
  6. 2026Atomicity for Agents: Exposing, Exploiting, and Mitigating TOCTOU Vulnerabilities in Browser-Use Agentscited by 6
  7. 2026Can AI Be a Good Peer Reviewer? A Survey of Peer Review Process, Evaluation, and the Futurecited by 6
  8. 2026SkillHarm: Lifecycle-Aware Skill-Based Attacks via Automated Constructioncited by 6
  9. 2025Your Harness is Not Secure: Benchmarking Real-world Threat of Command Line Interface Agentcited by 5
  10. 2026SnapGuard: Lightweight Prompt Injection Detection for Screenshot-Based Web Agentscited by 4
  11. 2026Recovering Policy-Induced Errors: Benchmarking and Trajectory Synthesis for Robust GUI Agentscited by 3
  12. 2026ROGUE: Evaluating Corrigibility Failures in Frontier Computer-Use Agentscited by 3
  13. 2026AgentLens: Interpretable Safety Steering via Mechanistic Subspaces for Multi-Turn Coding Agentcited by 3
  14. 2026Untrusted Content Masking for Web Agents with Security Guaranteescited by 3
  15. 2026StepJack: Benchmarking Computer-Use Agent Safety Against Multi-Step Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 3
  16. 2026Dual-Modality Multi-Stage Adversarial Safety Training: Robustifying Multimodal Web Agents Against Cross-Modal Attackscited by 2
  17. 2026Trust No Tool: Evaluating and Defending LLM Agents under Untrusted Tool Feedbackcited by 2
  18. 2026Don't Click That: Teaching Web Agents to Resist Deceptive Interfacescited by 1
  19. 2026PaperFit: Vision-in-the-Loop Typesetting Optimization for Scientific Documentscited by 1
  20. 2026Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teamingcited by 1
  21. 2026WebChallenger: A Reliable and Efficient Generalist Web Agentcited by 1
  22. 2026Invisible Ink Threats: Adversarial Goals Behind Legitimate Tasks in Computer-Use Agentscited by 1
  23. 2026Readable Before Actionable: Causal Tracing of Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1
  24. 2026RiskWebWorld: A Realistic Interactive Benchmark for GUI Agents in E-commerce Risk Managementcited by 0
  25. 2026Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliabilitycited by 0
  26. 2026Hidden in Plain Sight: Benchmarking Agent Safety Against Decomposition Attacks with DECOMPBENCHcited by 0
  27. 2026Humanly: A Configurable and Traceable Environment for Human-AI Collaborative Writingcited by 0
  28. 2026ADeptS-Bench: Measuring the Trustworthiness of Computer Use Agents Across Devicescited by 0
  29. 2026SIR: Self-improving Red-teaming for Compute Use Agentscited by 0
  30. 2026AgentHijack: Visual Patch Attacks on Multimodal Computer-Use Agentscited by 0
  31. 2026When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systemscited by 0
  32. 2026CoDeL: Co-Evolutionary Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM-based Agentscited by 0
  33. 2026The Backdrop Exposes What the World Around an Agent Costs Itcited by 0
  34. 2026BrowseSafe++: Benchmarking Prompt Injection Detection Across Web Contexts, Languages, and Browser Viewscited by 0

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2025A Systematization of Security Vulnerabilities in Computer Use Agents
  2. 2025Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition
  3. 2026SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinement
  4. 2025ARMs: Adaptive Red-Teaming Agent against Multimodal Models with Plug-and-Play Attacks
  5. 2026RIFT-Bench: Dynamic Red-teaming For Agentic AI Systems
  6. 2025EVA: Evolving Semantic Adversaries for Red-Teaming GUI Agents Against Environmental Injection Attacks
  7. 2024Red Team Redemption: A Structured Comparison of Open-Source Tools for Adversary Emulation
  8. 2025SIRAJ: Diverse and Efficient Red-Teaming for LLM Agents via Distilled Structured Reasoning