Hidden in Plain Sight: Benchmarking Agent Safety Against Decomposition Attacks with DECOMPBENCH
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
LLM-based Agents are becoming increasingly capable and widely deployed, creating growing incentives for adversarial misuse in the real-world. A key emerging threat is Decomposition Attacks citeglukhov2024breach, jones2024adversaries in which a harmful task is broken into simpler, benign subtasks that evade safety mechanisms when executed separately but cumulatively fulfill the malicious intent. Although recent benchmarks assess agent safety in multi-turn and multi-tool-use settings, they do not explicitly capture this form of decompositional misuse and may not represent realistic adversarial execution flows. To this end, we introduce DeCompBench, a benchmark designed specifically to evaluate agentic safety under decomposition attacks. DeCompBench is created with a decomposition-by-design principle using a graphical framework and enables harmful task decomposition into individually benign and executable subtasks with realistic workflows. Our experiments using a custom decomposer show that state-of-the-art agents exhibit high refusal rates on monolithic harmful tasks, but significantly lower refusal rates on their decomposed variants, while often inadvertently fulfilling the adversarial objectives. These findings underscore the need for safety evaluations against decomposition attacks and corresponding defenses. Our dataset is publicly available and can be found at https://huggingface.co/datasets/decompositionbench/DeCompBench.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 22 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Jun 2026.
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22 of 30 references.
Closest ancestors · 8
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Unsafer in Many Turns: Benchmarking and Defending Multi-Turn Safety Risks in Tool-Using Agents13 Feb
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- 2025OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety8 Jul
- 2025RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments28 May
- 2025SafeArena: Evaluating the Safety of Autonomous Web Agents6 Mar
- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents19 Dec
- 2024SafeAgentBench: A Benchmark for Safe Task Planning of Embodied LLM Agents17 Dec
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
Other references · 14
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- 2023SOTOPIA: Interactive Evaluation for Social Intelligence in Language Agentscited by 367
- 2024TheAgentCompany: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Consequential Real World Taskscited by 326
- 2024LLM Defenses Are Not Robust to Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks Yetcited by 151
- 2024HAICOSYSTEM: An Ecosystem for Sandboxing Safety Risks in Human-AI Interactionscited by 44
- 2025MCPMark: A Benchmark for Stress-Testing Realistic and Comprehensive MCP Usecited by 39
- 2025Measuring Agents in Productioncited by 37
- 2024Adversaries Can Misuse Combinations of Safe Modelscited by 32
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