mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap): A Controllable and Interactive Red-Teaming Platform for AI Agents

arXiv 2605.04808 ↗First posted 6 May 2026cs.AIcited by 13

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

AI agents are increasingly deployed across diverse domains to automate complex workflows through long-horizon and high-stakes action executions. Due to their high capability and flexibility, such agents raise significant security and safety concerns. A growing number of real-world incidents have shown that adversaries can easily manipulate agents into performing harmful actions, such as leaking API keys, deleting user data, or initiating unauthorized transactions. Evaluating agent security is inherently challenging, as agents operate in dynamic, untrusted environments involving external tools, heterogeneous data sources, and frequent user interactions. However, realistic, controllable, and reproducible environments for large-scale risk assessment remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap), the first controllable and interactive red-teaming platform for AI agents, spanning 14 real-world domains and over 50 simulation environments that replicate widely used systems such as Google Workspace, Paypal, and Slack. To scale the risk assessment of agents in DTap, we further propose DTap-Red, the first autonomous red-teaming agent that systematically explores diverse injection vectors (e.g., prompt, tool, skill, environment, combinations) and autonomously discovers effective attack strategies tailored to varying malicious goals. Using DTap-Red, we curate DTap-Bench, a large-scale red-teaming dataset comprising high-quality instances across domains, each paired with a verifiable judge to automatically validate attack outcomes. Through DTap, we conduct large-scale evaluations of popular AI agents built on various backbone models, spanning security policies, risk categories, and attack strategies, revealing systematic vulnerability patterns and providing valuable insights for developing secure next-generation agents.

Key facts. Cited by 13 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 6 of its 87 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 May 2026.

Builds on

6 of 87 references.

Closest ancestors · 2

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025ARMs: Adaptive Red-Teaming Agent against Multimodal Models with Plug-and-Play Attacks3 Oct
  2. 2025RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments28 May

Other references · 4

  1. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
  2. 2024Agent Hospital: A Simulacrum of Hospital with Evolvable Medical Agentscited by 218
  3. 2025SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agentscited by 71
  4. 2024FinRobot: An Open-Source AI Agent Platform for Financial Applications using Large Language Modelscited by 40

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 13.

13 papers.

Sort:

By area:

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Securing the AI Agent: A Unified Framework for Multi-Layer Agent Red Teaming
  2. 2025Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition
  3. 2026Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
  4. 2026AgentTrust: Runtime Safety Evaluation and Interception for AI Agent Tool Use
  5. 2026AgentXploit: Autonomous Repository-to-Runtime Red-Teaming for AI Agents
  6. 2025Mind the Gap: Comparing Model- vs Agentic-Level Red Teaming with Action-Graph Observability on GPT-OSS-20B
  7. 2026Redefining AI Red Teaming in the Agentic Era: From Weeks to Hours
  8. 2026Governing Execution Risk in Agentic AI Systems: A Trajectory-Guided Framework for Red Teaming