The Backdrop Exposes What the World Around an Agent Costs It
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Agent benchmarks test agents in worlds that stay still. Deployed agents work in worlds that other people also change. Someone texts the agent to send the money elsewhere or an order confirmation asks it to reply with a door code. We present BACKDROP, which asks how much of an agent's capability in a clean world survives in such a world. BACKDROP takes a task along with the agents execution environment, and plants four everyday hazards in its world, one at a time and all together. The instruction and the correct end state stay the same. Each hazard asks one question. Authority: does a message from another person override the user? Injection: does text planted in a record redirect the agent? Boundary: does a request pull it into an app it was not given? Fault: after a write fails without saying whether it landed, does the agent check before it retries? Across 3,678 variants and 16 models, , the average pass rate falls from 69.5% to 31.3% once all four hazards are present; the strongest models fall furthest (Claude Fable 5.1 from 96.6% to 56.0%). Agents have learned to resist injected text but often follow other unauthorized requests of other people. With all four hazards present, and counting only runs where the planted text reached the agent, agents followed another person's message in 46.4% of runs and injected text in 20.3%. The gap is consistent throughout all 16 models. BACKDROP formalizes these gaps and shows how an agent's score in a task's world is a ceiling on real-world performance.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 33 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Sep 2026.
Builds on
33 of 40 references.
References · 33
- 2021Evaluating Large Language Models Trained on Codecited by 8,053
- 2023WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agentscited by 1,908
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2024τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domainscited by 1,280
- 2024OSWorld: Benchmarking Multimodal Agents for Open-Ended Tasks in Real Computer Environmentscited by 1,134
- 2020Beyond Accuracy: Behavioral Testing of NLP models with CheckListcited by 979
- 2023Large Language Models Can Be Easily Distracted by Irrelevant Contextcited by 820
- 2025DeepSeek-V3.2: Pushing the Frontier of Open Large Language Modelscited by 755
- 2025Why Do Multi-Agent LLM Systems Fail?cited by 559
- 2024GSM-Symbolic: Understanding the Limitations of Mathematical Reasoning in Large Language Modelscited by 533
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandboxcited by 514
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agentscited by 476
21 more
- 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 441
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agentscited by 406
- 2025LLMs Get Lost In Multi-Turn Conversationcited by 400
- 2024AppWorld: A Controllable World of Apps and People for Benchmarking Interactive Coding Agentscited by 359
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agentscited by 341
- 2024TheAgentCompany: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Consequential Real World Taskscited by 306
- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agentscited by 280
- 2024ToolSandbox: A Stateful, Conversational, Interactive Evaluation Benchmark for LLM Tool Use Capabilitiescited by 272
- 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Designcited by 256
- 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attackscited by 140
- 2024ST-WebAgentBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating Safety and Trustworthiness in Web Agentscited by 126
- 2025Progent: Securing AI Agents with Privilege Controlcited by 121
- 2025OS-Harm: A Benchmark for Measuring Safety of Computer Use Agentscited by 104
- 2025Establishing Best Practices for Building Rigorous Agentic Benchmarkscited by 94
- 2025Authenticated Delegation and Authorized AI Agentscited by 63
- 2026The MiniMax-M2 Series: Mini Activations Unleashing Max Real-World Intelligencecited by 50
- 2025RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environmentscited by 42
- 2026Gaia2: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Dynamic and Asynchronous Environmentscited by 28
- 2025CRITICTOOL: Evaluating Self-Critique Capabilities of Large Language Models in Tool-Calling Error Scenarioscited by 19
- 2025OpenApps: Simulating Environment Variations to Measure UI-Agent Reliabilitycited by 10
- 2026DAGGER: Distractor-Aware Graph Generation for Executable Reasoning in Math Problemscited by 9
Built on by
Not cited yet.