Readable Before Actionable: Causal Tracing of Indirect Prompt Injection
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance also fits: Agent skill learning and evolution
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Abstract (arXiv)
Indirect prompt injection causes LLM agents to follow commands embedded in external data. A probe may distinguish instructions from data without identifying a state edit that changes the next action. We study this gap through counterfactual role probes, component-wise activation patching, and separate interventions on AgentDojo trajectories. Role decoding survives changes in content and format. In controlled Qwen tests, it precedes strong tool-choice effects from patches along an independently estimated role direction. On AgentDojo, directions estimated from hijacked and resisted training trajectories reduce attack success at pre-action and injected-span positions, but have little effect at random positions. In longer Qwen trajectories, single-position edits become less effective at later layers; span-wide and repeated edits reduce attack success on the same evaluation set. Removing the learned channel subspace preserves role decoding, yet effective intervention directions transfer poorly across the tested channels. These findings distinguish a readable role signal from an effective behavioral intervention: depth matters in controlled tool choice, while position and context also matter in attack trajectories.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. First posted on arXiv 4 Oct 2026.
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