mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Defending Against Prompt Injection with DataFilter

arXiv 2510.19207 ↗First posted 22 Oct 2025cs.CRcited by 30

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

Key facts. Cited by 30 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. First posted on arXiv 22 Oct 2025.

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 29.

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  1. 2026Taming OpenClaw: Security Analysis and Mitigation of Autonomous LLM Agent Threatscited by 25
  2. 2026From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agentscited by 23
  3. 2026CausalArmor: Efficient Indirect Prompt Injection Guardrails via Causal Attributioncited by 13
  4. 2026PISmith: Reinforcement Learning-based Red Teaming for Prompt Injection Defensescited by 13
  5. 2025SoK: Trust-Authorization Mismatch in LLM Agent Interactionscited by 11
  6. 2026A Systematic Security Evaluation of OpenClaw and Its Variantscited by 11
  7. 2026PIArena: A Platform for Prompt Injection Evaluationcited by 10
  8. 2026Assessing Automated Prompt Injection Attacks in Agentic Environmentscited by 5
  9. 2026AutoDojo: Adaptive Black-Box Attacks Reveal the Limits of IPI Defenses and Task-Specification Effects in LLM Agentscited by 4
  10. 2026Agents at Risk: How Users Unwittingly Undermine LLM Safetycited by 3
  11. 2026Untrusted Content Masking for Web Agents with Security Guaranteescited by 3
  12. 2026When Agents Remember Too Much: Memory Poisoning Attacks on Large Language Model Agentscited by 3
18 more
  1. 2026InjecMEM: Memory Injection Attack on LLM Agent Memory Systemscited by 3
  2. 2026SecOPD: Mitigating Adaptive Prompt Injections by On-Policy Distillationcited by 2
  3. 2026RedVisor: Reasoning-Aware Prompt Injection Defense via Zero-Copy KV Cache Reusecited by 1
  4. 2026Agent Against Agent: An Agentic System for Automatic Prompt Injection Red Teamingcited by 1
  5. 2026What Guides the Agent? Adjudicating Unauthorized Behavior via Localizing Behavior-Guiding Instructionscited by 1
  6. 2026Weight space Detection of Backdoors in LoRA Adapterscited by 0
  7. 2026CLASP: Defending Hybrid Large Language Models Against Hidden State Poisoning Attackscited by 0
  8. 2026Security Attack and Defense Strategies for Autonomous Agent Frameworks: A Layered Review with OpenClaw as a Case Studycited by 0
  9. 2026A Low-Latency Fraud Detection Layer for Detecting Adversarial Interaction Patterns in LLM-Powered Agentscited by 0
  10. 2026Ghost in the Context: Policy-Carriage Integrity in LLM Agentscited by 0
  11. 2026Rapid Poison: Practical Poisoning Attacks Against the Rapid Response Frameworkcited by 0
  12. 2026ALIBI: Adaptive Agentic Attacks on LLM-Based Vulnerability Detectors via Adversarial Code Commentscited by 0
  13. 2026On Understanding, Identifying, and Mitigating Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Modelscited by 0
  14. 2026PIPES: Securing Agent Perception with Provenance and Priorscited by 0
  15. 2026Render Before Reading: Visual Rendering as a Prompt Injection Defensecited by 0
  16. 2026CounterSteer: Suppressing Indirect Prompt Injection with Activation Steeringcited by 0
  17. 2026ToolFence: Fine-Grained Authorization for Secure Tool-Using LLM Agentscited by 0
  18. 2026MASCRDM: Multi-Agent System for Compliance Risk Detection and Mitigation in Training Process of Large Language Modelscited by 0