mlsanityData to 13 Oct 2026

Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classification

arXiv 2302.12355 ↗First posted 23 Feb 2023cs.LG cs.GTcited by 17

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Abstract (arXiv)

We study the problem of online binary classification where strategic agents can manipulate their observable features in predefined ways, modeled by a manipulation graph, in order to receive a positive classification. We show this setting differs in fundamental ways from non-strategic online classification. For instance, whereas in the non-strategic case, a mistake bound of ln|H| is achievable via the halving algorithm when the target function belongs to a known class H, we show that no deterministic algorithm can achieve a mistake bound o(Delta) in the strategic setting, where Delta is the maximum degree of the manipulation graph (even when |H|=O(Delta)). We obtain an algorithm achieving mistake bound O(Deltaln|H|). We also extend this to the agnostic setting and obtain an algorithm with a Delta multiplicative regret, and we show no deterministic algorithm can achieve o(Delta) multiplicative regret. Next, we study two randomized models based on whether the random choices are made before or after agents respond, and show they exhibit fundamental differences. In the first model, at each round the learner deterministically chooses a probability distribution over classifiers inducing expected values on each vertex (probabilities of being classified as positive), which the strategic agents respond to. We show that any learner in this model has to suffer linear regret. On the other hand, in the second model, while the adversary who selects the next agent must respond to the learner's probability distribution over classifiers, the agent then responds to the actual hypothesis classifier drawn from this distribution. Surprisingly, we show this model is more advantageous to the learner, and we design randomized algorithms that achieve sublinear regret bounds against both oblivious and adaptive adversaries.

Key facts. Cited by 17 papers in the map (data through 13 Oct 2026). Builds on 21 of its 48 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Feb 2023.

Builds on

21 of 48 references.

References · 21

  1. 2020Performative Predictioncited by 322
  2. 2015Strategic Classificationcited by 257
  3. 2017Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferencescited by 127
  4. 2018The Social Cost of Strategic Classificationcited by 105
  5. 2018How Do Classifiers Induce Agents To Invest Effort Strategically?cited by 83
  6. 2018The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulationcited by 75
  7. 2021Strategic Classification in the Darkcited by 66
  8. 2020Causal Strategic Linear Regressioncited by 65
  9. 2021Strategic Classification Made Practicalcited by 58
  10. 2021Who Leads and Who Follows in Strategic Classification?cited by 53
  11. 2020PAC-Learning for Strategic Classificationcited by 50
  12. 2020The Strategic Perceptroncited by 48
9 more
  1. 2021Information Discrepancy in Strategic Learningcited by 48
  2. 2021Alternative Microfoundations for Strategic Classificationcited by 47
  3. 2020Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanismscited by 46
  4. 2020The Role of Randomness and Noise in Strategic Classificationcited by 40
  5. 2018Downstream Effects of Affirmative Actioncited by 34
  6. 2022Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agentscited by 29
  7. 2022On classification of strategic agents who can both game and improvecited by 27
  8. 2022Learning Losses for Strategic Classificationcited by 22
  9. 2018Access to Population-Level Signaling as a Source of Inequalitycited by 2

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Cited by year (2026 to 13 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2023: 3; 2024: 3; 2025: 7; 2026: 4.

17 papers.

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