Linear Strategic Classification with Endogenous Improvements
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Abstract (arXiv)
Classical models of strategic classification treat agents' responses to a deployed classifier as cosmetic: features change, but true labels do not. We study an improvement-aware variant in which strategic responses can change outcomes: agents choose post-deployment features strategically at a cost, and labels are then drawn from a fixed conditional outcome law. We formalize this problem for linear classifiers under a single-index qualification model and linear-decomposable costs. Under these assumptions, agents' best responses reduce to a closed-form shift of the decision boundary, and the resulting improvement-aware classification problem is learnable with linear sample complexity. As post-deployment labels are unavailable a priori, we begin by establishing a generalization bound with oracle access to the outcome law. One of our main contributions is a practical plug-in algorithm that replaces the oracle with an estimate, together with a bound on its improvement-aware error. We also show that the optimal classifier for standard strategic classification is a better proxy for the improvement-aware objective than the non-strategic Bayes-optimal classifier. Experiments on semi-synthetic and synthetic data support these findings and the plausibility of our assumptions.
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References · 30
- 2021Retiring Adult: New Datasets for Fair Machine Learningcited by 449
- 2018Actionable Recourse in Linear Classificationcited by 328
- 2020Performative Predictioncited by 327
- 2015Strategic Classificationcited by 257
- 2021A survey on datasets for fairness-aware machine learningcited by 157
- 2017Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferencescited by 128
- 2018The Social Cost of Strategic Classificationcited by 105
- 2019Strategic Classification is Causal Modeling in Disguisecited by 92
- 2018How Do Classifiers Induce Agents To Invest Effort Strategically?cited by 83
- 2021Strategic Classification in the Darkcited by 66
- 2020PAC-Learning for Strategic Classificationcited by 50
- 2020The Strategic Perceptroncited by 48
18 more
- 2020Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanismscited by 46
- 2022Generalized Strategic Classification and the Case of Aligned Incentivescited by 34
- 2023Causal Strategic Classification: A Tale of Two Shiftscited by 30
- 2022On classification of strategic agents who can both game and improvecited by 27
- 2023Strategic Classification under Unknown Personalized Manipulationcited by 24
- 2023Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classificationcited by 17
- 2024Learnability Gaps of Strategic Classificationcited by 16
- 2023Sequential Strategic Screeningcited by 8
- 2024Learning under Imitative Strategic Behavior with Unforeseeable Outcomescited by 8
- 2025Incentivizing Desirable Effort Profiles in Strategic Classification: The Role of Causality and Uncertaintycited by 8
- 2024Algorithmic Decision-Making under Agents with Persistent Improvementcited by 7
- 2025PAC Learning with Improvementscited by 6
- 2018HELOC Applicant Risk Performance Evaluation by Topological Hierarchical Decompositioncited by 5
- 2024Nonparametric logistic regression with deep learningcited by 2
- 2025Anticipating Gaming to Incentivize Improvement: Guiding Agents in (Fair) Strategic Classificationcited by 2
- 2025Conservative classifiers do consistently well with improving agents: characterizing statistical and online learningcited by 2
- 2025Desirable Effort Fairness and Optimality Trade-offs in Strategic Learningcited by 2
- 2026Multi-Level Strategic Classification: Incentivizing Improvement through Promotion and Relegation Dynamicscited by 1
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