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On Randomized Algorithms in Online Strategic Classification

arXiv 2602.06257 ↗First posted 5 Feb 2026cs.LG cs.GTcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Online strategic classification studies settings in which agents strategically modify their features to obtain favorable predictions. For example, given a classifier that determines loan approval based on credit scores, applicants may open or close credit cards and bank accounts to obtain a positive prediction. The learning goal is to achieve low mistake or regret bounds despite such behavior. While randomized algorithms have the potential to offer advantages to the learner in strategic settings, they have been largely underexplored. In the realizable setting, no lower bound is known for randomized algorithms, and existing lower bound constructions for deterministic learners can be circumvented by randomization. In the agnostic setting, the best known regret upper bound is O(T3/4log1/4T|mathcal H|), which is far from the standard online learning rate of O(√Tlog|mathcal H|). In this work, we provide refined bounds for online strategic classification in both settings; our bounds depend on the Littlestone dimension Ldim(mathcal H) of the hypothesis class mathcal H and the maximum degree Delta of the manipulation graph. In the realizable setting, we extend, for T > Ldim(mathcal H) Delta2, the existing lower bound Omega(Ldim(mathcal H) Delta) for deterministic learners to all learners. This yields the first lower bound that applies to randomized learners. We then provide the first randomized learner that improves the known (deterministic) upper bound of O(Ldim(mathcal H) · Delta log Delta). In the agnostic setting, we give an improper randomized learner that improves the regret upper bound to O(√Tlog|mathcal H|), matching the standard online learning rate. We also show a larger lower bound for all proper learning rules, demonstrating that improperness is necessary to achieve the optimal rate.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 23 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Feb 2026.

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References · 23

  1. 2020Performative Predictioncited by 318
  2. 2015Strategic Classificationcited by 256
  3. 2017Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferencescited by 126
  4. 2015Explore no more: Improved high-probability regret bounds for non-stochastic banditscited by 120
  5. 2018The Social Cost of Strategic Classificationcited by 105
  6. 2019Strategic Classification is Causal Modeling in Disguisecited by 92
  7. 2018The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulationcited by 75
  8. 2021Strategic Classification in the Darkcited by 66
  9. 2020Causal Strategic Linear Regressioncited by 65
  10. 2020PAC-Learning for Strategic Classificationcited by 50
  11. 2020The Strategic Perceptroncited by 48
  12. 2021Information Discrepancy in Strategic Learningcited by 48
11 more
  1. 2020Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanismscited by 46
  2. 2019The Disparate Equilibria of Algorithmic Decision Making when Individuals Invest Rationallycited by 41
  3. 2020The Role of Randomness and Noise in Strategic Classificationcited by 40
  4. 2022On classification of strategic agents who can both game and improvecited by 27
  5. 2023Strategic Classification under Unknown Personalized Manipulationcited by 23
  6. 2022Learning Losses for Strategic Classificationcited by 22
  7. 2023Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classificationcited by 17
  8. 2024Learnability Gaps of Strategic Classificationcited by 16
  9. 2024Strategic Littlestone Dimension: Improved Bounds on Online Strategic Classificationcited by 8
  10. 2024The Real Price of Bandit Information in Multiclass Classificationcited by 7
  11. 2025Should Decision-Makers Reveal Classifiers in Online Strategic Classification?cited by 5

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