mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks

arXiv 2602.20156 ↗First posted 23 Feb 2026cs.CR cs.LGcited by 82

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

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Abstract (arXiv)

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Key facts. Cited by 82 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 21 of its 44 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Feb 2026.

Builds on

21 of 44 references.

Closest ancestors · 8

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Agent Skills Enable a New Class of Realistic and Trivially Simple Prompt Injections30 Oct
  2. 2025OS-Harm: A Benchmark for Measuring Safety of Computer Use Agents17 Jun
  3. 2025Privacy Reasoning in Ambiguous Contexts13 Jun
  4. 2025Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents against Prompt Injections10 Jun
  5. 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
  6. 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
  7. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
  8. 2024AirGapAgent: Protecting Privacy-Conscious Conversational Agents8 May

Other references · 13

  1. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  2. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
  3. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 441
  4. 2023Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practicalcited by 276
  5. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 233
  6. 2024PrivacyLens: Evaluating Privacy Norm Awareness of Language Models in Actioncited by 161
  7. 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 108
  8. 2024Can LLMs Separate Instructions From Data? And What Do We Even Mean By That?cited by 70
  9. 2024Get my drift? Catching LLM Task Drift with Activation Deltascited by 61
  10. 2024Operationalizing Contextual Integrity in Privacy-Conscious Assistantscited by 36
  11. 2024Dataset and Lessons Learned from the 2024 SaTML LLM Capture-the-Flag Competitioncited by 20
  12. 2025LLMail-Inject: A Dataset from a Realistic Adaptive Prompt Injection Challengecited by 20
1 more
  1. 2025Invisible Prompts, Visible Threats: Malicious Font Injection in External Resources for Large Language Modelscited by 9

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 82.

82 papers.

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  1. 2026Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystemscited by 42
  2. 2026ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 25
  3. 2026SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinementcited by 24
  4. 2026Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agentscited by 22
  5. 2026SkillProbe: Security Auditing for Emerging Agent Skill Marketplaces via Multi-Agent Collaborationcited by 21
  6. 2026SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfacescited by 15
  7. 2026MalSkillBench: A Runtime-Verified Benchmark of Malicious Agent Skillscited by 14
  8. 2026ARGUS: Defending LLM Agents Against Context-Aware Prompt Injectioncited by 13
  9. 2026Towards Secure Agent Skills: Architecture, Threat Taxonomy, and Security Analysiscited by 11
  10. 2026Context Matters: Repository-Aware Security Analysis of the Agent Skill Ecosystemcited by 10
  11. 2026Under the Hood of SKILL.md: Semantic Supply-chain Attacks on AI Agent Skill Registrycited by 10
  12. 2026AgentTrap: Measuring Runtime Trust Failures in Third-Party Agent Skillscited by 9
38 more
  1. 2026AI Agents May Always Fall for Prompt Injectionscited by 9
  2. 2026AIRGuard: Guarding Agent Actions with Runtime Authority Controlcited by 9
  3. 2026Benign in Isolation, Harmful in Composition: Security Risks in Agent Skill Ecosystemscited by 9
  4. 2026Trojan's Whisper: Stealthy Manipulation of OpenClaw through Injected Bootstrapped Guidancecited by 8
  5. 2026VIGIL: Runtime Enforcement of Behavioral Specifications in AI Agent Skillscited by 8
  6. 2026Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIscited by 8
  7. 2026Poise: Position-Aware One-Instruction Skill Injection for Silent Execution on LLM Agentscited by 7
  8. 2026Many-Tier Instruction Hierarchy in LLM Agentscited by 6
  9. 2026RouteGuard: Internal-Signal Detection of Skill Poisoning in LLM Agentscited by 6
  10. 2026Structured Security Auditing and Robustness Enhancement for Untrusted Agent Skillscited by 6
  11. 2026Behavioral Integrity Verification for AI Agent Skillscited by 6
  12. 2026Agent Skill Evaluation and Evolution: Frameworks and Benchmarkscited by 6
  13. 2026Detecting Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild using Attentioncited by 6
  14. 2026Cloak and Detonate: Scanner Evasion and Dynamic Detection of Agent Skill Malwarecited by 6
  15. 2026Dynamic Agent Skills: A Lifecycle Survey and Taxonomy of Evolving Skill Librariescited by 6
  16. 2026No Attack Required: Semantic Fuzzing for Specification Violations in Agent Skillscited by 5
  17. 2026SABER: Benchmarking Operational Safety of LLM Coding Agents in Stateful Project Workspacescited by 5
  18. 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 5
  19. 2026SkillMutator: Benchmarking and Defending Language-and-Code Cross-modal Attacks on LLM Agent Skillscited by 5
  20. 2026Seeing Is Not Screening: Multimodal Hidden Instruction Attacks on Agent Skill Scannerscited by 5
  21. 2026Latent Reuse in Agent Skills: Multi-modal Clone Detection at Ecosystem Scalecited by 4
  22. 2026SkillScope: Toward Fine-Grained Least-Privilege Enforcement for Agent Skillscited by 4
  23. 2026Trust Me, Import This: Dependency Steering Attacks via Malicious Agent Skillscited by 4
  24. 2026SkillHarm: Lifecycle-Aware Skill-Based Attacks via Automated Constructioncited by 4
  25. 2026SkillGuard: A Permission-Centric Framework for Agent Skill Securitycited by 4
  26. 2026PhantomSkill: Malicious Code Injection in Agent Skill Ecosystemscited by 4
  27. 2026Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 4
  28. 2026From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoorscited by 3
  29. 2026Skills Are Not Islands: Measuring Dependency and Risk in Agent Skill Supply Chainscited by 3
  30. 2026OpenSkillRisk: Benchmarking Agent Safety When Using Real-World Risky Third-Party Skillscited by 3
  31. 2026ColluSkill: Adversarial Cross-Skill Composition for Evading Agent Skill Scannerscited by 3
  32. 2026When Child Inherits: Modeling and Exploiting Subagent Spawn in Multi-Agent Networkscited by 2
  33. 2026Red-Teaming Agent Execution Contexts: Open-World Security Evaluation on OpenClawcited by 2
  34. 2026Runtime Skill Audit: Targeted Runtime Probing for Agent Skill Securitycited by 2
  35. 2026SLBench: Evaluating How LLM Agents Follow Logical Relations in Skillscited by 2
  36. 2026SkillGate: Cost Efficient Runtime Malicious Skill File Detection in Coding Agentscited by 2
  37. 2026Practice Makes Unsafe: Skill Misevolution in Self-Improving LLM Agentscited by 2
  38. 2026CompoSkill: Compositional Skill Chain Attacks from Individually Scanner-Passing LLM Agent Skillscited by 2

50 most cited of 82 All 82 (JSON)

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  1. 2026SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents
  2. 2026SkillBloat: Token Amplification Attacks via Skill Injection in LLM Coding Agents
  3. 2026"Do Not Mention This to the User": Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild
  4. 2026SkillsMetric: Mapping the Detection Boundary of Static Analysis for Malicious Agent Skills
  5. 2026Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale
  6. 2026Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study
  7. 2026SkillShield: Prompt-Space Security Skills for LLM Coding Agents
  8. 2026Towards a Risk Assessment of Malicious Skill Files in Coding Agents