Detecting Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild using Attention
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
LLM agents increasingly load skills, file-based packages of natural-language instructions written by third parties and distributed through marketplaces, that execute with the user's privileges. A single malicious skill can exfiltrate data, hijack the agent, or persist as a supply-chain foothold, which turns the skill marketplace into a new attack surface for agentic systems. Prompt-injection defenses do not carry over to this setting. They rely on a boundary between trusted instructions and untrusted data, whereas a skill is itself a body of instructions, so an injected command sits among many legitimate ones and inherits their authority. We present Locate-and-Judge, a two-stage detector designed for this regime. A lightweight locator scores the structural spans of a skill by the instruction-following attention each span draws and retains only the top-K. A judge then examines the retained spans in detail. Concentrating the costly judgment on a few high-attention spans lets the detector audit an entire marketplace instead of a sample. Compared to direct LLM-based scanning, this approach offers an order-of-magnitude cost reduction, dramatically increasing its scalability at a small cost to recall, and it dominates keyword and regex baselines at comparable expense. Deployed at marketplace scale and at negligible cost, Locate-and-Judge flags skills with high precision, the majority of which we manually confirmed as malicious, surfacing dozens of live malicious skills, including several disguised as benign functionality and many that SkillSpector and Cisco Skill Scanner fail to detect. We release the resulting labeled dataset.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 19 of its 22 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 22 Jun 2026.
Builds on
19 of 22 references.
Closest ancestors · 6
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Exploiting LLM Agent Supply Chains via Payload-less Skills14 May
- 2026SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems8 Apr
- 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks23 Feb
- 2025VeriGuard: Enhancing LLM Agent Safety via Verified Code Generation3 Oct
- 2025Beyond the Protocol: Unveiling Attack Vectors in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) Ecosystem31 May
- 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
Other references · 13
- 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Modelcited by 8,065
- 2024Qwen2.5 Technical Reportcited by 4,942
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2026DeepSeek-V4: Towards Highly Efficient Million-Token Context Intelligencecited by 1,040
- 2024SecAlign: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Preference Optimizationcited by 210
- 2026Agent Skills for Large Language Models: Architecture, Acquisition, Security, and the Path Forwardcited by 113
- 2024Attention Tracker: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMscited by 95
- 2024Get my drift? Catching LLM Task Drift with Activation Deltascited by 72
- 2025Model Context Protocol (MCP) at First Glance: Studying the Security and Maintainability of MCP Serverscited by 65
- 2023LLM Platform Security: Applying a Systematic Evaluation Framework to OpenAI's ChatGPT Pluginscited by 51
- 2025A Closer Look at System Prompt Robustnesscited by 32
1 more
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.
8 papers.
- 2026MaliciousSkillBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Malicious Agent Skill Detectioncited by 1
- 2026SkillPoison: Progressive Skill Poisoning via Successful Experiencescited by 1
- 2026SkillSentry: Adaptive Honey Worlds for Dynamic Safety Testing of Agent Skillscited by 0
- 2026Towards a Systems Foundation for Agentic Skills: Architecture, Lifecycle, and Securitycited by 0
- 2026SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skillscited by 0
- 2026SKILLLITE: Evidence-Guided Malicious Skill Auditing with Compact LLMscited by 0
- 2026Pretext: Defeating Malicious Skill Detection Frameworks for AI Agentscited by 0
- 2026CoRedSkill: Stealthy Skill Composition Attacks via AST-Guided Injectioncited by 0
- 2026CoRedSkill: Stealthy Skill Composition Attacks via AST-Guided Injection14 Oct 2026
- 2026SkillPoison: Progressive Skill Poisoning via Successful Experiences6 Oct 2026
- 2026Pretext: Defeating Malicious Skill Detection Frameworks for AI Agents30 Sep 2026
- 2026SKILLLITE: Evidence-Guided Malicious Skill Auditing with Compact LLMs29 Sep 2026
- 2026SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skills12 Sep 2026
- 2026Towards a Systems Foundation for Agentic Skills: Architecture, Lifecycle, and Security30 Aug 2026
- 2026MaliciousSkillBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Malicious Agent Skill Detection20 Aug 2026
- 2026SkillSentry: Adaptive Honey Worlds for Dynamic Safety Testing of Agent Skills4 Aug 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026RouteGuard: Internal-Signal Detection of Skill Poisoning in LLM Agents
- 2026SkillsMetric: Mapping the Detection Boundary of Static Analysis for Malicious Agent Skills
- 2026SkillSieve: A Hierarchical Triage Framework for Detecting Malicious AI Agent Skills
- 2026"Do Not Mention This to the User": Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild
- 2026Seeing Is Not Screening: Multimodal Hidden Instruction Attacks on Agent Skill Scanners
- 2026Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study
- 2026SkillAtlas: An Attack Trace Library for Agent Skills
- 2026SkillScreen: High-Recall Screening of Malicious Agent Skills with Decision Models