VIGIL: Runtime Enforcement of Behavioral Specifications in AI Agent Skills
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Agentic systems increasingly act through third-party skills, allowing model-generated decisions to affect files, communication channels, and cyber-physical devices. These skills often include natural-language specifications that define access permissions, disclosure limits, execution privileges, and required preconditions. Although such specifications describe the intended boundaries of skill behavior, they do not by themselves provide executable runtime enforcement. Enforcing them raises a contextual granularity challenge: even when a policy is written for a particular task context, a monitor must still decide which events to observe, what state to retain, how far across the execution to reason, and where to intervene. Choosing the wrong granularity can either block benign executions or miss violations that emerge only across multiple actions. Most existing enforcement mechanisms, however, assume a fixed event model or enforcement point. In this work, we present VIGIL, an end-to-end runtime enforcement framework for agentic systems. VIGIL checks an agent's actual execution trace against behavioral policies from skill specifications, operator-defined constraints, and global rules spanning multiple skills. To make such policies executable, VIGIL introduces a policy language that captures context-specific enforcement requirements over agent-tool events, including temporal dependencies, argument constraints, and value-flow conditions. The language is paired with symbolic evaluation rules that translate policies into SMT constraints over finite traces, allowing VIGIL to detect violations that depend on event order, argument relationships, or cross-call value flow rather than relying on fixed single-call filters. On real LLM-agent runs spanning office-document, operational, and engineering tasks, VIGIL detects policy violations with over 95% recall and a false-positive rate below 10%.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 28 of its 63 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Jun 2026.
Builds on
28 of 63 references.
Closest ancestors · 17
Same direction, newest first
- 2026AgentTrap: Measuring Runtime Trust Failures in Third-Party Agent Skills13 May
- 2026No Attack Required: Semantic Fuzzing for Specification Violations in Agent Skills13 May
- 2026Semia: Auditing Agent Skills via Constraint-Guided Representation Synthesis1 May
- 2026Ghost in the Agent: Redefining Information Flow Tracking for LLM Agents25 Apr
- 2026HarmfulSkillBench: How Do Harmful Skills Weaponize Your Agents?16 Apr
- 2026Policy-Invisible Violations in LLM-Based Agents14 Apr
- 2026Towards Secure Agent Skills: Architecture, Threat Taxonomy, and Security Analysis3 Apr
- 2026SkillProbe: Security Auditing for Emerging Agent Skill Marketplaces via Multi-Agent Collaboration22 Mar
- 2026The Attack and Defense Landscape of Agentic AI: A Comprehensive Survey11 Mar
- 2026AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification26 Feb
- 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks23 Feb
- 2026Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale15 Jan
5 more
- 2025AgentArmor: Enforcing Program Analysis on Agent Runtime Trace to Defend Against Prompt Injection2 Aug
- 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2024SafeAgentBench: A Benchmark for Safe Task Planning of Embodied LLM Agents17 Dec
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep
Other references · 11
- 2019A Survey of Autonomous Driving: Common Practices and Emerging Technologiescited by 373
- 2026SkillsBench: Benchmarking How Well Agent Skills Work Across Diverse Taskscited by 289
- 2026SoK: Agentic Skills -- Beyond Tool Use in LLM Agentscited by 120
- 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 108
- 2026Agent Skills for Large Language Models: Architecture, Acquisition, Security, and the Path Forwardcited by 105
- 2025Contextual Agent Security: A Policy for Every Purposecited by 55
- 2024Cedar: A New Language for Expressive, Fast, Safe, and Analyzable Authorization (Extended Version)cited by 31
- 2025EchoLeak: The First Real-World Zero-Click Prompt Injection Exploit in a Production LLM Systemcited by 26
- 2026AgentCgroup: Understanding and Controlling OS Resources of AI Agentscited by 13
- 2026Agent-Diff: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Enterprise API Tasks via Code Execution with State-Diff-Based Evaluationcited by 12
- 2024FORAY: Towards Effective Attack Synthesis against Deep Logical Vulnerabilities in DeFi Protocolscited by 3
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.
8 papers.
- 2026Forensic Trajectory Signatures for Agent Memory Poisoning Detectioncited by 2
- 2026FAVA: Formal Authorization for Verified Agents with Evidence-Backed Permission Graphscited by 2
- 2026Testing and Evaluation of Agentic AI Systems In Military Command and Controlcited by 0
- 2026EvoUndo: Recoverability-Constrained Self-Evolution for LLM Agent Harnessescited by 0
- 2026Versioned Transitive Dependency-Closure Binding and Operation-Time Effect Governance for Agent Skills: ClosureBoundcited by 0
- 2026LeaseGuard: Incumbent-Preserving Admission Control for Privileged LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026Who Holds the Pen? Let Specifications, Not Agents, Sign Offcited by 0
- 2026Authorization Closure Graph: Minimal Repair for LLM Agents with Evolving User Instructionscited by 0
- 2026Authorization Closure Graph: Minimal Repair for LLM Agents with Evolving User Instructions26 Sep 2026
- 2026Who Holds the Pen? Let Specifications, Not Agents, Sign Off24 Sep 2026
- 2026LeaseGuard: Incumbent-Preserving Admission Control for Privileged LLM Agents21 Sep 2026
- 2026Versioned Transitive Dependency-Closure Binding and Operation-Time Effect Governance for Agent Skills: ClosureBound5 Sep 2026
- 2026EvoUndo: Recoverability-Constrained Self-Evolution for LLM Agent Harnesses28 Aug 2026
- 2026Testing and Evaluation of Agentic AI Systems In Military Command and Control20 Aug 2026
- 2026FAVA: Formal Authorization for Verified Agents with Evidence-Backed Permission Graphs29 Jul 2026
- 2026Forensic Trajectory Signatures for Agent Memory Poisoning Detection29 Jun 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Runtime Governance for AI Agents: Policies on Paths
- 2025VIGIL: A Reflective Runtime for Self-Healing Agents
- 2026SARC: A Governance-by-Architecture Framework for Agentic AI Systems
- 2026Evidence-Calibrated Runtime Reconstruction for Agent Skills Across Heterogeneous Coding Agents
- 2026SkillGuard: A Permission-Centric Framework for Agent Skill Security
- 2026ActGov: Governing LLM Agent Actions via Policy-Constrained Validation
- 2026OpenAgentFlow: Enabling System-Wide Safety Boundaries for Heterogeneous AI Agent Fleets
- 2026AgentWall: A Runtime Safety Layer for Local AI Agents