mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Benign in Isolation, Harmful in Composition: Security Risks in Agent Skill Ecosystems

arXiv 2606.15242 ↗First posted 13 Jun 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 13

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Skills are becoming the capability layer through which LLM agents turn plans into actions, but their use introduces security risks such as data leakage, unauthorized operations, and tool misuse. Existing vetting usually evaluates each skill in isolation, while real agent tasks often invoke multiple skills in a shared execution context. This creates Skill Composition Risk (SCR): a skill that appears benign alone can become harmful when its outputs, trust signals, authorization cues, or side effects influence later invocations along an activated path. We introduce SCR-Bench to evaluate this risk in controlled, sandboxed skill environments. Rather than relying only on textual intent or surface behavior, SCR-Bench records downstream state changes and path-level outcomes across composed skill executions. It contains three sub-benchmarks: SCR-CapFlow for capability-flow composition, SCR-TrustLift for trust-transfer composition, and SCR-AuthBlur for authorization-confusion composition. Across SCR-Bench, composed paths expose risks that are largely absent under isolated evaluation. In SCR-CapFlow, attack success rate reaches 33.6 percent under composition, compared with near-zero isolated baselines. In SCR-TrustLift, attack success rate exceeds 96.5 percent on four of five backends. In SCR-AuthBlur, the risky-approval rate increases by 71.8 percent relative to the L0 isolated baseline under the L1 context setting. These results show that agent skill security should be assessed at the level of activated paths rather than isolated artifacts. SCR and SCR-Bench provide a foundation for path-aware risk evaluation and defense in LLM agent skill ecosystems. Benchmark: https://github.com/saint-viperx/SCR_Bench.

Key facts. Cited by 13 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 29 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Jun 2026.

Builds on

29 of 30 references.

Closest ancestors · 19

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026HarmfulSkillBench: How Do Harmful Skills Weaponize Your Agents?16 Apr
  2. 2026ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection13 Apr
  3. 2026Semantic Intent Fragmentation: A Single-Shot Compositional Attack on Multi-Agent AI Pipelines8 Apr
  4. 2026TraceSafe: A Systematic Assessment of LLM Guardrails on Multi-Step Tool-Calling Trajectories8 Apr
  5. 2026SkillSieve: A Hierarchical Triage Framework for Detecting Malicious AI Agent Skills8 Apr
  6. 2026SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinement5 Apr
  7. 2026SkillProbe: Security Auditing for Emerging Agent Skill Marketplaces via Multi-Agent Collaboration22 Mar
  8. 2026Trojan's Whisper: Stealthy Manipulation of OpenClaw through Injected Bootstrapped Guidance20 Mar
  9. 2026Formal Analysis and Supply Chain Security for Agentic AI Skills27 Feb
  10. 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks23 Feb
  11. 2026AgentLAB: Benchmarking LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Attacks18 Feb
  12. 2026"Do Not Mention This to the User": Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild6 Feb
7 more
  1. 2025Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents28 Apr
  2. 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
  3. 2024Breaking Agents: Compromising Autonomous LLM Agents Through Malfunction Amplification30 Jul
  4. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
  5. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
  6. 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents18 Jan
  7. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 10

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
  2. 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
  3. 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,947
  4. 2023Gorilla: Large Language Model Connected with Massive APIscited by 1,332
  5. 2026GLM-5: from Vibe Coding to Agentic Engineeringcited by 587
  6. 2025Kimi K2: Open Agentic Intelligencecited by 567
  7. 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defensescited by 364
  8. 2026SoK: Agentic Skills -- Beyond Tool Use in LLM Agentscited by 130
  9. 2026A Systematic Security Evaluation of OpenClaw and Its Variantscited by 13
  10. 2026AEGIS: No Tool Call Left Unchecked -- A Pre-Execution Firewall and Audit Layer for AI Agentscited by 8

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 13.

13 papers.

Sort:

By area:

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026When Safe Skills Collide: Measuring Compositional Risk in Agent Skill Ecosystems
  2. 2026SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfaces
  3. 2026SkillHarm: Lifecycle-Aware Skill-Based Attacks via Automated Construction
  4. 2026OpenSkillRisk: Benchmarking Agent Safety When Using Real-World Risky Third-Party Skills
  5. 2026Practice Makes Unsafe: Skill Misevolution in Self-Improving LLM Agents
  6. 2026Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale
  7. 2026Benchmarking Security Risk Detection and Verification in Open Agentic Skill Ecosystems
  8. 2026Stealth Apart, Harm Together: Skill Cascading Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems