mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

HarnessSafe: Evaluating Safety Across Persistent Carriers in Agent Harnesses

arXiv 2608.06984 ↗First posted 7 Aug 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 3

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Abstract (arXiv)

Modern agent harnesses persist state across tasks and sessions through persistent carriers like memory, skills, tools, and shared artifacts. However, this capability creates delayed safety risks: attacker-influenced content can cross system boundaries and later affect the execution of a benign request. Existing benchmarks typically focus on a few carriers or harnesses, while end-to-end attack-success rates reveal little about how risks propagate. To this end, we present HarnessSafe, a benchmark comprising 328 executable cases across seven persistent-carrier families and evaluated on most mainstream agent harnesses. Each case is specified as a Persistent-Risk Lifecycle that traces attacker influence from its initial entry, through persistence across carriers and system boundaries, to a later benign trigger and an observable violation. We further introduce a multi-stage, trace-based evaluation that uses observable execution evidence to determine how far each attack chain progresses and where it is stopped. Experiments show that containment is carrier-specific and strongly depends on the harness-model configuration. Both the harness and model backend substantially shape containment outcomes, while attack success rates cannot reflect distinct lifecycle progression patterns.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 19 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 7 Aug 2026.

Builds on

19 of 34 references.

References · 19

  1. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Basescited by 429
  2. 2025Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interactioncited by 144
  3. 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attackscited by 90
  4. 2025MCPSecBench: A Systematic Security Benchmark and Playground for Testing Model Context Protocolscited by 51
  5. 2026Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injectionscited by 48
  6. 2026Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystemscited by 45
  7. 2026AgentLAB: Benchmarking LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Attackscited by 39
  8. 2026From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agentscited by 33
  9. 2026Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agentscited by 27
  10. 2026SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfacescited by 19
  11. 2026Benign in Isolation, Harmful in Composition: Security Risks in Agent Skill Ecosystemscited by 13
  12. 2026Trojan Hippo: Weaponizing Agent Memory for Data Exfiltrationcited by 12
7 more
  1. 2026Coding Agents Are Guessing: Measuring Action-Boundary Violations in Underspecified DevOps Instructionscited by 10
  2. 2026MemPoison: Uncovering Persistent Memory Threats and Structural Blind Spots in LLM Agentscited by 7
  3. 2026Benchmarks for Trajectory Safety Evaluation and Diagnosis in OpenClaw and Codex: ATBench-Claw and ATBench-Codexcited by 6
  4. 2026Bad Memory: Evaluating Prompt Injection Risks from Memory in Agentic Systemscited by 6
  5. 2026Understanding and Evaluating Claw-like Agent Security Through a Computer-Systems Lenscited by 5
  6. 2026SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agentscited by 2
  7. 2026Agent Hacks Agent: Autoresearch for Production-Agent Red-Teamingcited by 2

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.

3 papers.