No Attack Required: Semantic Fuzzing for Specification Violations in Agent Skills
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)
LLM-powered agents can silently delete documents, leak credentials, or transfer funds on a routine user request, not because the agent was attacked, but because the skill it invoked broke its own declared safety rules. We call these specification violations: benign inputs cause a skill to breach the natural-language guardrails in its own specification, typically because the guardrail's semantics are undefined for autonomous execution, or because the implementation silently ignores the documented constraint. These violations are invisible to static analyzers, traditional fuzzers, and prompt-injection defenses alike, yet they undermine the very contract a user trusts when installing a skill. We present Sefz, a goal-directed semantic fuzzing framework that automatically discovers specification violations in agent skills. Sefz translates each guardrail into a reachability goal over an annotated execution trace, reducing violation checking to a deterministic graph query. An LLM-based mutator generates benign inputs whose traces progressively approach the violation patterns, guided by a multi-armed bandit that uses goal-proximity as its reward signal. On 402 real-world skills from the largest public agent-skill marketplace, Sefz finds specification violations in 120 (29.9%), including 26 previously unknown exploitable guardrail violations in deployed skills. Six recurring specification pitfalls explain the bulk of the failures, suggesting concrete principles for safer skill design.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 22 of its 45 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 May 2026.
Builds on
22 of 45 references.
Closest ancestors · 12
Same direction, newest first
- 2026SkillProbe: Security Auditing for Emerging Agent Skill Marketplaces via Multi-Agent Collaboration22 Mar
- 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks23 Feb
- 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis11 Feb
- 2026"Do Not Mention This to the User": Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild6 Feb
- 2026Taming Various Privilege Escalation in LLM-Based Agent Systems: A Mandatory Access Control Framework17 Jan
- 2025MCPGuard : Automatically Detecting Vulnerabilities in MCP Servers27 Oct
- 2025AgentArmor: Enforcing Program Analysis on Agent Runtime Trace to Defend Against Prompt Injection2 Aug
- 2025PromptArmor: Simple yet Effective Prompt Injection Defenses21 Jul
- 2025Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents28 Apr
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systems8 Mar
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
Other references · 10
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
- 2025Model Context Protocol (MCP): Landscape, Security Threats, and Future Research Directionscited by 257
- 2024SecAlign: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Preference Optimizationcited by 179
- 2025DataSentinel: A Game-Theoretic Detection of Prompt Injection Attackscited by 124
- 2025JBShield: Defending Large Language Models from Jailbreak Attacks through Activated Concept Analysis and Manipulationcited by 46
- 2023Demystifying RCE Vulnerabilities in LLM-Integrated Appscited by 35
- 2021DocTer: Documentation Guided Fuzzing for Testing Deep Learning API Functionscited by 21
- 2024PAPILLON: Efficient and Stealthy Fuzz Testing-Powered Jailbreaks for LLMscited by 20
- 2024An In-Depth Investigation of Data Collection in LLM App Ecosystemscited by 14
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 5.
5 papers.
- 2026MalSkillBench: A Runtime-Verified Benchmark of Malicious Agent Skillscited by 14
- 2026VIGIL: Runtime Enforcement of Behavioral Specifications in AI Agent Skillscited by 8
- 2026SkillSentry: Reliable Skill Execution for LLM Agents via Runtime Assurancecited by 1
- 2026An Empirical Study of Downstream Adaptation for Agent Skillscited by 0
- 2026SkillSpec: Intent-Masked Specification Reasoning for Agent Skill Correctnesscited by 0
- 2026SkillSpec: Intent-Masked Specification Reasoning for Agent Skill Correctness5 Sep 2026
- 2026SkillSentry: Reliable Skill Execution for LLM Agents via Runtime Assurance10 Aug 2026
- 2026An Empirical Study of Downstream Adaptation for Agent Skills3 Jul 2026
- 2026VIGIL: Runtime Enforcement of Behavioral Specifications in AI Agent Skills25 Jun 2026
- 2026MalSkillBench: A Runtime-Verified Benchmark of Malicious Agent Skills5 Jun 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Semia: Auditing Agent Skills via Constraint-Guided Representation Synthesis
- 2026Pretext: Defeating Malicious Skill Detection Frameworks for AI Agents
- 2026Agentic Fuzzing: Opportunities and Challenges
- 2026Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study
- 2026SkillAtlas: An Attack Trace Library for Agent Skills
- 2026Tool Specifications Matter: Uncovering and Mitigating Safety Risks in AI Agents
- 2026SeedSmith: LLM-Driven Seed Synthesis for Directed Fuzzing ↗
- 2026Can Agents Trust Their Skills? Uncovering Unsafe Chains of Trust in Skill-Based LLM Agents