OBLIVION: Workflow-Level Operational Skill Unlearning for Deployed Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)
Large language model agents are becoming operational interfaces to files, memories, registries, and external tools. This deployment shift creates a new skill revocation problem: after a skill is removed from an explicit registry, an agent may still reconstruct it from residual carriers such as archives, transcripts, schemas, or memory entries. We study this problem as operational skill unlearning, where the goal is not parameter-level forgetting, but preventing a deployed agent from rebuilding a revoked skill through primitive tools. We introduce OBLIVION, a controlled benchmark and defense harness for revoked-skill resurrection. OBLIVION models each episode as a source-to-sink workflow, applies Cross-Surface Coherent Erasure to reduce residual carriers, and uses frozen workflow remediation near dangerous sinks. On the locked 88 attack episodes, the no-defense arm reaches formal attack success rate 1.0. OBLIVION reduces the rate to 0.114 and impact-weighted exposure to 0.115 while keeping locked utility at 1.0 and benign block rate at 0. In a separate skill-attack-derived sandbox, OBLIVION reduces attack success from 1.0 to 0.2 and impact-weighted exposure from 1.0 to 0.213 while preserving all utility controls. These results support workflow-level evaluation beyond checking explicit skill entries.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 14 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 8 Aug 2026.
Builds on
14 of 20 references.
Closest ancestors · 6
Same direction, newest first
- 2026SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinement5 Apr
- 2026How Your Credentials Are Leaked by LLM Agent Skills: An Empirical Study3 Apr
- 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks23 Feb
- 2026SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents15 Feb
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep
Other references · 8
- 2020Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Taskscited by 9,160
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
- 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,072
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2019Machine Unlearningcited by 1,020
- 2019Universal Adversarial Triggers for Attacking and Analyzing NLPcited by 709
- 2019Certified Data Removal from Machine Learning Modelscited by 512
- 2021A Large-scale Temporal Measurement of Android Malicious Apps: Persistence, Migration, and Lessons Learnedcited by 2
Built on by
Not cited yet.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026SkillRevise: Improving LLM-Authored Agent Skills via Trace-Conditioned Skill Revision
- 2026Evidence-Calibrated Runtime Reconstruction for Agent Skills Across Heterogeneous Coding Agents
- 2026AgentLeak: Cloning Stronger LLM Agent Capabilities onto Weaker Agents Beyond Skill Stealing
- 2026Behavioral Skill Reconstruction: Reconstructing Hidden Functionality from LLM Agent Skills
- 2026Forgetting Without Restarting: Execution-State Unlearning for Stateful LLM Agents
- 2026SkillAtlas: An Attack Trace Library for Agent Skills
- 2026Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
- 2026SkillApt: Learning When to Activate Agent Skills from Counterfactual Evidence