SABER: Benchmarking Operational Safety of LLM Coding Agents in Stateful Project Workspaces
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models are increasingly deployed as coding agents, shifting safety from individual responses to action sequences. Existing benchmarks, however, primarily assess whether models refuse unsafe prompts, leaving impacts on stateful workspaces largely unexamined. We present SABER, a benchmark for environment-aware operational safety that places models in realistic agent-style projects and evaluates safety from the final environment state after a sequence of actions. Beyond binary safety-violation reports, SABER categorizes violations by cause, enabling analysis of model-specific safety profiles. Our evaluations show that even the best-performing model has more than a 54% harmful safety-violation rate (HSR), suggesting that current alignment remains insufficient for realistic project environments. SABER further reveals distinct safety profiles across models. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/sssr-lab/saber.
Key facts. Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 13 of its 22 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 31 May 2026.
Builds on
13 of 22 references.
Closest ancestors · 6
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks23 Feb
- 2026NAAMSE: Framework for Evolutionary Security Evaluation of Agents7 Feb
- 2024RedCode: Risky Code Execution and Generation Benchmark for Code Agents12 Nov
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
- 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents18 Jan
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep
Other references · 7
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
- 2024OR-Bench: An Over-Refusal Benchmark for Large Language Modelscited by 244
- 2024PrivacyLens: Evaluating Privacy Norm Awareness of Language Models in Actioncited by 171
- 2023Tensor Trust: Interpretable Prompt Injection Attacks from an Online Gamecited by 145
- 2026AgentDyn: Are Your Agent Security Defenses Deployable in Real-World Dynamic Environments?cited by 59
- 2025SafeToolBench: Pioneering a Prospective Benchmark to Evaluating Tool Utilization Safety in LLMscited by 22
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 6.
6 papers.
- 2026AgentS4D: Benchmarking Runtime Risks across the Execution Lifecycle of LLM-Based Workspace Agentscited by 3
- 2026No Task Fails Every Time: Why One-Shot Audits Are Structurally Blind to Agent Damagecited by 0
- 2026When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systemscited by 0
- 2026SCOUT: Synergizing Reasoning and Tool-Use for Computer-Use Safetycited by 0
- 2026A Competing-Hazards Systematization of Loss of Control in Autonomous Agentscited by 0
- 2026Pincer: Resource Authorization for Agents using a Digital Twincited by 0
- 2026Pincer: Resource Authorization for Agents using a Digital Twin1 Oct 2026
- 2026A Competing-Hazards Systematization of Loss of Control in Autonomous Agents29 Sep 2026
- 2026SCOUT: Synergizing Reasoning and Tool-Use for Computer-Use Safety28 Sep 2026
- 2026When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systems20 Sep 2026
- 2026No Task Fails Every Time: Why One-Shot Audits Are Structurally Blind to Agent Damage15 Aug 2026
- 2026AgentS4D: Benchmarking Runtime Risks across the Execution Lifecycle of LLM-Based Workspace Agents29 Jul 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026What Breaks When LLMs Code? Characterizing Operational Safety Failures of Agentic Code Assistants
- 2026S3: Improving Agent Safety through Multi-Stage Defense
- 2026Tool Specifications Matter: Uncovering and Mitigating Safety Risks in AI Agents
- 2025SafetyFlow: An Agent-Flow System for Automated LLM Safety Benchmarking
- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents
- 2026SHE: Trajectory-driven Safety Harness Evolution for LLM Agents
- 2026Who Tests the Testers? Systematic Enumeration and Coverage Audit of LLM Agent Tool Call Safety
- 2026Risky-Bench: Probing Agentic Safety Risks under Real-World Deployment