SkillBloat: Token Amplification Attacks via Skill Injection in LLM Coding Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Agent skills extend coding agents with task-specific instructions, scripts, and resources, but they also create a trusted instruction channel that can be abused beyond conventional security attacks. This paper studies token amplification through skill injection: an economic resource-abuse threat in which a malicious skill causes an agent to consume substantially more tokens than needed for normal task execution. We present SkillBloat, a two-phase framework that first screens a library of diverse attack-type conditions across multiple amplification mechanisms and then refines the strongest candidate through LLM-guided full-document skill rewriting. Evaluated on a real-world skill benchmark, SkillBloat achieves 5.4184x-10.1455x average best amplification across multiple coding-agent target configurations. An ablation shows that the second-stage refinement loop consistently improves average best amplification over Phase 1 attack-type screening alone, demonstrating that iterative optimization provides additional benefit beyond initial attack-type selection. These results show that skill ecosystems expose a practical resource-amplification attack surface that is orthogonal to existing security-oriented skill poisoning.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 15 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 22 Aug 2026.
Builds on
15 of 20 references.
Closest ancestors · 7
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Convergent Detour Hijacking: Task-Preserving Resource Amplification in Skill-Based LLM Agents12 Aug
- 2026Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystems3 Apr
- 2026Clawdrain: Exploiting Tool-Calling Chains for Stealthy Token Exhaustion in OpenClaw Agents1 Mar
- 2026SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents15 Feb
- 2026Beyond Max Tokens: Stealthy Resource Amplification via Tool Calling Chains in LLM Agents16 Jan
- 2026Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale15 Jan
- 2025Agent Skills Enable a New Class of Realistic and Trivially Simple Prompt Injections30 Oct
Other references · 8
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
- 2023Reflexion: Language Agents with Verbal Reinforcement Learningcited by 4,276
- 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2024Crabs: Consuming Resource via Auto-generation for LLM-DoS Attack under Black-box Settingscited by 35
- 2024An Engorgio Prompt Makes Large Language Model Babble oncited by 30
- 2025Advancing Tool-Augmented Large Language Models via Meta-Verification and Reflection Learningcited by 24
- 2025ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinkingcited by 23
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Not cited yet.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks
- 2026"Do Not Mention This to the User": Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild
- 2026SkillReducer: Optimizing LLM Agent Skills for Token Efficiency
- 2026Towards a Risk Assessment of Malicious Skill Files in Coding Agents
- 2026PhantomSkill: Malicious Code Injection in Agent Skill Ecosystems
- 2026Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study
- 2026Encrypted Skills Can Become New Security Exploits If AI Agents Know How to Decipher
- 2026SkillShield: Prompt-Space Security Skills for LLM Coding Agents