Poise: Position-Aware One-Instruction Skill Injection for Silent Execution on LLM Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Large language model agents use skills that package reusable instructions, code, and resources. Existing skill-injection attacks exploit trust in these packages by adding malicious content. As agents become more capable, however, they can skip unnecessary steps, inspect code, and reject unrelated actions. We introduce PERSIST, which connects attacker-chosen actions to useful functions for recurring tasks while reducing source inspection and expressed suspicion. It builds these helpers from simulated executions without access to real evaluation tasks or feedback. Skill descriptions introduce the helpers, while usage instructions explain how to call them. The extra action resides in an imported module separate from the helper entry file. Executing the helper can then serve both the user's task and the attacker's objective. Experiments on SkillsBench and Skill-Inject show that frozen packages transfer across four agent--model configurations and generalize to multiple unseen tasks without revision. Harmful effects can occur alongside successful task completion. A separate matched comparison shows higher harmful-effect rates with less source inspection and expressed suspicion than two baselines. Paired case studies illustrate how PERSIST can evade rejection, while ablations confirm the contributions of documentation guidance and module separation. Code: https://github.com/liofoil/SkillSafety.
Key facts. Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 21 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 Jun 2026.
Builds on
21 of 34 references.
Closest ancestors · 8
Same direction, newest first
- 2026SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinement5 Apr
- 2026Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystems3 Apr
- 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks23 Feb
- 2026"Do Not Mention This to the User": Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild6 Feb
- 2026Memory Poisoning Attack and Defense on Memory Based LLM-Agents9 Jan
- 2025VPI-Bench: Visual Prompt Injection Attacks for Computer-Use Agents3 Jun
- 2025Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction5 Mar
- 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
Other references · 13
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
- 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
- 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,947
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
- 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 605
- 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 375
- 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 267
- 2026CoEvoSkills: Self-Evolving Agent Skills via Co-Evolutionary Verificationcited by 128
- 2023Jatmo: Prompt Injection Defense by Task-Specific Finetuningcited by 106
- 2020Backstabber's Knife Collection: A Review of Open Source Software Supply Chain Attackscited by 61
- 2022Taxonomy of Attacks on Open-Source Software Supply Chainscited by 58
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 7.
7 papers.
- 2026ColluSkill: Adversarial Cross-Skill Composition for Evading Agent Skill Scannerscited by 4
- 2026When Agents Learn to Be You: Benchmarking Privacy Leakage, Impersonation Risk, and Defenses in Persona Skillscited by 3
- 2026When Experience Becomes Instruction: Trajectory Poisoning in Self-Evolving Agent Skill Systemscited by 2
- 2026SkillSentry: Adaptive Honey Worlds for Dynamic Safety Testing of Agent Skillscited by 0
- 2026SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skillscited by 0
- 2026Hiding in Plain Sight: Decoupling Pretext from Actuation for Skill Poisoning in LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026Deny Without Disabling: Authorization-Paired Evaluation and Control for Multi-Agent Systemscited by 0
- 2026Deny Without Disabling: Authorization-Paired Evaluation and Control for Multi-Agent Systems30 Sep 2026
- 2026Hiding in Plain Sight: Decoupling Pretext from Actuation for Skill Poisoning in LLM Agents30 Sep 2026
- 2026SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skills12 Sep 2026
- 2026ColluSkill: Adversarial Cross-Skill Composition for Evading Agent Skill Scanners10 Aug 2026
- 2026When Experience Becomes Instruction: Trajectory Poisoning in Self-Evolving Agent Skill Systems6 Aug 2026
- 2026When Agents Learn to Be You: Benchmarking Privacy Leakage, Impersonation Risk, and Defenses in Persona Skills4 Aug 2026
- 2026SkillSentry: Adaptive Honey Worlds for Dynamic Safety Testing of Agent Skills4 Aug 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026SkillBloat: Token Amplification Attacks via Skill Injection in LLM Coding Agents
- 2026SkillPoison: Progressive Skill Poisoning via Successful Experiences
- 2026RouteGuard: Internal-Signal Detection of Skill Poisoning in LLM Agents
- 2026Encrypted Skills Can Become New Security Exploits If AI Agents Know How to Decipher
- 2026SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents
- 2026SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems
- 2026Injection-Execution Dissociation: A Mechanistic Evaluation of Persistent Memory Attacks and Defenses in Stateful LLM Agents
- 2026Behavioral Skill Reconstruction: Reconstructing Hidden Functionality from LLM Agent Skills