Unequal Uncertainty: Rethinking Algorithmic Interventions for Mitigating Discrimination from AI

Uncertainty in artificial intelligence (AI) predictions raises pressing legal and ethical questions for AI-assisted decision-making. This article examines two uncertainty-based algorithmic interventions that act as guardrails for human-AI interaction: selective abstention, which withholds high-uncertainty predictions from human decision-makers, and selective friction, which presents such predictions together with salient warnings about the model's uncertainty. Prior work suggests that uncertainty-based abstention can exacerbate disparities where under-represented groups are more likely to receive uncertain predictions. We provide, to our knowledge, the first doctrinal analysis of uncertainty-based algorithmic interventions under laws from the United Kingdom and examine their consequences through two AI-assisted case studies: consumer credit and risk of reoffending. We show that the use of uncertainty thresholds, though formally neutral, can generate discriminatory effects. We argue that both interventions pose risks of unlawful discrimination, but that selective friction is legally preferable. It preserves access to the prediction and is more likely to satisfy proportionality under the Equality Act 2010. Whether selective friction also improves decision quality in practice is uncertain. We identify conditions under which it may improve or worsen decision quality.