mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Multi-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion

arXiv 2106.06480 ↗First posted 11 Jun 2021cs.GT cs.AIcited by 12

Not on the map. Why?

Abstract (arXiv)

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent assumption that the sender knows the receiver's utility. This can be relaxed by considering an online learning framework in which the sender repeatedly faces a receiver of an unknown, adversarially selected type. We study, for the first time, an online Bayesian persuasion setting with multiple receivers. We focus on the case with no externalities and binary actions, as customary in offline models. Our goal is to design no-regret algorithms for the sender with polynomial per-iteration running time. First, we prove a negative result: for any 0 < α ≤ 1, there is no polynomial-time no-α-regret algorithm when the sender's utility function is supermodular or anonymous. Then, we focus on the case of submodular sender's utility functions and we show that, in this case, it is possible to design a polynomial-time no-(1 - frac1e)-regret algorithm. To do so, we introduce a general online gradient descent scheme to handle online learning problems with a finite number of possible loss functions. This requires the existence of an approximate projection oracle. We show that, in our setting, there exists one such projection oracle which can be implemented in polynomial time.

Key facts. Cited by 12 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 15 of its 37 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Jun 2021.

Builds on

15 of 37 references.

References · 15

  1. 2016Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Gamescited by 37
  2. 2013Optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvaturecited by 29
  3. 2015Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasioncited by 21
  4. 2017Efficient Online Linear Optimization with Approximation Algorithmscited by 12
  5. 2018Online Improper Learning with an Approximation Oraclecited by 11
  6. 2016Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalitiescited by 9
  7. 2017Targeting and Signaling in Ad Auctionscited by 6
  8. 2019On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalitiescited by 6
  9. 2015Mixture Selection, Mechanism Design, and Signalingcited by 5
  10. 2015Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing Gamescited by 5
  11. 2020Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetrycited by 5
  12. 2021Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasioncited by 5
3 more
  1. 2019Persuading Voters: It's Easy to Whisper, It's Hard to Speak Loudcited by 4
  2. 2020Persuading Voters in District-based Electionscited by 3
  3. 2016Computational Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasioncited by 1

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2022: 1; 2023: 5; 2024: 2; 2025: 1; 2026: 3.

12 papers.