Lingering Authority: Revocable Resource-and-Effect Capabilities for Coding Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Software engineering coding agents
Abstract (arXiv)
Coding agents often receive broad tool access for an entire task, even when a resource is needed only for one subgoal. We call this gap lingering authority: a temporary resource/effect capability remains exposed after the episode that justified it has closed. PORTICO is a reference monitor for revocable capabilities exposed to the planner. It compiles an explicit task contract into initial capabilities, grant rules, trusted closure predicates, and global deny rules. A request-grant-invoke lifecycle materializes expansions as opaque, epoch-bound handles. Closure removes those handles from the next planner interface and rejects stale replay before side effects. The monitor assumes mediated tools and a sound typed catalog. In controlled coding-agent tasks, PORTICO records no executed contract-forbidden effects in the evaluated runs, while controlled grants recover boundary work blocked by a fixed narrow envelope. A non-revoking comparator receives the same initial envelope and the same grants at the same turns. On the closure slice, both systems match task success, scope compliance, and all pre-closure decisions; PORTICO then rejects 10/10 post-closure reuses, while the comparator permits 10/10. A deterministic stale-write audit records 0/6 versus 6/6 executed forbidden effects. Scripted traces and six live model traces over file writes, git mutation, and network egress show the same split. In a four-episode same-policy diagnostic, broad request exposure preserves zero executed forbidden effects but raises blocked proposals from 67 to 84. Frozen real-repository runs, with commits and traces recorded, exercise the same lifecycle on real project layouts.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Software engineering coding agents, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 51 of its 68 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 21 Jun 2026.
Builds on
51 of 68 references.
Closest ancestors · 3
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.
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