mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

When Consent Outlives Context: Residual Authority Replay in Long-Lived Agents

arXiv 2609.33910 ↗First posted 27 Sep 2026cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

LLM agents increasingly rely on user approval to authorize security-sensitive actions at runtime. Such approvals are granted within a specific task and execution context. In long-lived agents, authorization decisions may need to persist across tasks or sessions. We find that this continuity can outlive the context that originally justified the approval, creating residual authority reusable without renewed consent. We expose this failure mode through a longitudinal attack that starts from a target security-sensitive action, identifies the authority required to execute it, induces benign interactions that legitimately obtain that authority, and later replays the residual authority during adversarial execution. Across controlled and live settings, we demonstrate that residual-authority replay arises in practice and substantially increases the success of prompt-injection and context-rebinding attacks. We evaluate 508 AgentDojo attack cases across six LLM families using production-derived authorization semantics. With residual authority, attack success rate (ASR) increases by up to 35.1 percentage points compared with a fresh authorization state. In live context-rebinding attacks on 55 Terminal-Bench cases across three real-world production coding agents, residual-authority replay increases ASR by 24.9 percentage points on average. These findings expose a fundamental mismatch between persistent authorization and the contextual nature of user consent in long-lived LLM agents.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 19 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 27 Sep 2026.

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19 of 31 references.

Closest ancestors · 8

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Practice Makes Unsafe: Skill Misevolution in Self-Improving LLM Agents13 Aug
  2. 2026Temporary Authority, Permanent Effects: Commit-Time Authorization for LLM Agents11 Jul
  3. 2026When Lower Privileges Suffice: Investigating Over-Privileged Tool Selection in LLM Agents18 Jun
  4. 2026FragFuse: Bypassing Access Control of Large Language Model Agents via Memory-Based Query Fragmentation and Fusion14 Jun
  5. 2026Options, Not Clicks: Lattice Refinement for Consent-Driven MCP Authorization12 May
  6. 2026On Safety Risks in Experience-Driven Self-Evolving Agents18 Apr
  7. 2026Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections17 Feb
  8. 2025Your Agent May Misevolve: Emergent Risks in Self-evolving LLM Agents30 Sep

Other references · 11

  1. 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,195
  2. 2023Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behaviorcited by 3,500
  3. 2023Voyager: An Open-Ended Embodied Agent with Large Language Modelscited by 2,081
  4. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  5. 2023MemGPT: Towards LLMs as Operating Systemscited by 1,295
  6. 2026Terminal-Bench: Benchmarking Agents on Hard, Realistic Tasks in Command Line Interfacescited by 515
  7. 2026TAME: A Trustworthy Test-Time Evolution of Agent Memory with Systematic Benchmarkingcited by 7
  8. 2026Lingering Authority: Revocable Resource-and-Effect Capabilities for Coding Agentscited by 5
  9. 2026Are You Still the Agent I Authorized? Earned Authority under a Fixed Ceiling for Evolving Agentscited by 4
  10. 2026When Context Gets Root: Privilege Escalation in LLM Harnessescited by 2
  11. 2026Safe to Resume? Breaking Execution Continuity of Agent Execution via Rollbackcited by 2

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  1. 2026When Memory Becomes Authority: Benchmarking Authority Collapse at the Memory Consolidation Boundary
  2. 2026What If Prompt Injection Never Left? Rethinking Agent Security through Cross-Session Stored Prompt Injection
  3. 2026ARGUS: Defending LLM Agents Against Context-Aware Prompt Injection
  4. 2026Boundary-State Control for Tool-Using Language-Model Agents: Commit-Time Consistency under State Drift
  5. 2026Silent Failures in Agentic Security Evaluation: A Validated Harness for Tool-Call Mediation Under Indirect Prompt Injection
  6. 2026From Approval to Execution: Reconstruction-Aware Repair Analysis for LLM-Agent Software
  7. 2026Defusing Explosive Prompts: Understanding and Preventing Trigger-Based Prompt Injections in LLM Agents
  8. 2026Beyond Single-Use Tokens: Durable Authorization State for Replay-Resistant LLM Agent Actions