Efficient Uncoupled Learning Dynamics with tildeO!left(T-1/4right) Last-Iterate Convergence in Bilinear Saddle-Point Problems over Convex Sets under Bandit Feedback
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Abstract (arXiv)
In this paper, we study last-iterate convergence of learning algorithms in bilinear saddle-point problems, a preferable notion of convergence that captures the day-to-day behavior of learning dynamics. We focus on the challenging setting where players select actions from compact convex sets and receive only bandit feedback. Our main contribution is the design of an uncoupled learning algorithm that guarantees last-iterate convergence to the Nash equilibrium with high probability. We establish a convergence rate of tildeO(T-1/4) up to polynomial factors in problem parameters. Crucially, our proposed algorithm is computationally efficient, requiring only an efficient linear optimization oracle over the players' compact action sets. The algorithm is obtained by combining techniques from experimental design and the classic Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) framework, with a carefully chosen regularizer function tailored to the geometry of the action set of each learner.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 21 of its 42 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Feb 2026.
Builds on
21 of 42 references.
References · 21
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9 more
- 2013Volumetric Spanners: an Efficient Exploration Basis for Learningcited by 23
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.
3 papers.