mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Async Control: Stress-testing Asynchronous Control Measures for LLM Agents

arXiv 2512.13526 ↗First posted 15 Dec 2025cs.LGcited by 18

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

LLM-based software engineering agents are increasingly used in real-world development tasks, often with access to sensitive data or security-critical codebases. Such agents could intentionally sabotage these codebases if they were misaligned. We investigate asynchronous monitoring, in which a monitoring system reviews agent actions after the fact. Unlike synchronous monitoring, this approach does not impose runtime latency, while still attempting to disrupt attacks before irreversible harm occurs. We treat monitor development as an adversarial game between a blue team (who design monitors) and a red team (who create sabotaging agents). We attempt to set the game rules such that they upper bound the sabotage potential of an agent based on Claude 4.1 Opus. To ground this game in a realistic, high-stakes deployment scenario, we develop a suite of 5 diverse software engineering environments that simulate tasks that an agent might perform within an AI developer's internal infrastructure. Over the course of the game, we develop an ensemble monitor that achieves a 6% false negative rate at 1% false positive rate on a held out test environment. Then, we estimate risk of sabotage at deployment time by extrapolating from our monitor's false negative rate. We describe one simple model for this extrapolation, present a sensitivity analysis, and describe situations in which the model would be invalid. Code is available at: https://github.com/UKGovernmentBEIS/async-control.

Key facts. Cited by 18 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 21 of its 28 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 15 Dec 2025.

Builds on

21 of 28 references.

Closest ancestors · 7

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Reliable Weak-to-Strong Monitoring of LLM Agents26 Aug
  2. 2025SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agents17 Jun
  3. 2025How to evaluate control measures for LLM agents? A trajectory from today to superintelligence7 Apr
  4. 2025A sketch of an AI control safety case28 Jan
  5. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
  6. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
  7. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 14

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
  2. 2023Efficient Memory Management for Large Language Model Serving with PagedAttentioncited by 5,767
  3. 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 338
  4. 2025Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safetycited by 222
  5. 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversioncited by 207
  6. 2024Stress-Testing Capability Elicitation With Password-Locked Modelscited by 42
  7. 2024Games for AI Control: Models of Safety Evaluations of AI Deployment Protocolscited by 28
  8. 2024Adaptive Deployment of Untrusted LLMs Reduces Distributed Threatscited by 27
  9. 2025Monitoring Decomposition Attacks in LLMs with Lightweight Sequential Monitorscited by 21
  10. 2024Subversion Strategy Eval: Can language models statelessly strategize to subvert control protocols?cited by 14
  11. 2025RepliBench: Evaluating the Autonomous Replication Capabilities of Language Model Agentscited by 12
  12. 2025CTRL-ALT-DECEIT: Sabotage Evaluations for Automated AI R&Dcited by 11
2 more
  1. 2025Evaluating Control Protocols for Untrusted AI Agentscited by 9
  2. 2025Optimizing AI Agent Attacks With Synthetic Datacited by 6

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Citing papers per year: 2026: 18.

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  1. 2026NEXUS: Structured Runtime Safety for Tool-Using LLM Agents
  2. 2026When Agentic Executions Fail: Detecting and Localizing Runtime Faults from Telemetry
  3. 2026Tool-Making and Self-Evolving LLM Agents in Low-Latency Systems
  4. 2026AgentChaos: Chaos Engineering for Agent Systems via Programmatic Fault Injection
  5. 2026How does information access affect LLM monitors' ability to detect sabotage?
  6. 2026Why Formal Monitors Fail: Attack Distribution Entropy as a Coverage Bound for LTL-Based LLM Agent Safety
  7. 2026Agentic Security: A Systematization of Tools, Failure Modes, and Design Laws for LLM-Driven Penetration Testing
  8. 2026Auto: The AGI Compiler