mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Instrumental Monitor Evasion Emerges Under Ordinary Task Pressure

arXiv 2609.30217 ↗First posted 24 Sep 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

A central concern in AI safety is that agents may treat oversight as an obstacle when it conflicts with completing their goals. We study instrumental evasion, the propensity of LLM agents to circumvent runtime monitoring as a means of completing ordinary tasks. We introduce EvasionBench, a benchmark of 50 diverse task-policy pairs in which completing the task requires an operation prohibited by a runtime monitor. Agents know that their tool calls are monitored and are prompted to continue working when they pause. Across our evaluations, best-of-3 evasion attempt rates reach up to 98% and success rates up to 88%, with substantial variance across models. Claude Fable 5.1 succeeds less often, but frequently makes creative attempts to circumvent the monitor. Evasion generally increases with test-time compute, with higher evasion rates at greater reasoning effort and token use. Traces show that agents encode prohibited commands, decompose operations across tool calls, and retry until relevant context leaves the monitor's history. We also find that GPT-6 Astra's low evasion rate comes with overrefusal, as it frequently abandons otherwise solvable tasks under a denial-of-service prompt injection. Our findings show that ordinary task pressure can lead to adaptive attempts to evade runtime monitors without an explicit adversarial objective. Effective oversight must therefore remain robust against repeated attempts, as the persistence that helps agents solve difficult tasks can also drive them to circumvent their guardrails.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 16 of its 33 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Sep 2026.

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16 of 33 references.

Closest ancestors · 4

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Adaptive Attacks on Trusted Monitors Subvert AI Control Protocols10 Oct
  2. 2025Scaling Laws For Scalable Oversight25 Apr
  3. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions19 Apr
  4. 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion12 Dec

Other references · 12

  1. 2024τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domainscited by 1,280
  2. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 478
  3. 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 338
  4. 2024ToolSandbox: A Stateful, Conversational, Interactive Evaluation Benchmark for LLM Tool Use Capabilitiescited by 272
  5. 2025Natural Emergent Misalignment from Reward Hacking in Production RLcited by 111
  6. 2024DrAttack: Prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction Makes Powerful LLM Jailbreakerscited by 91
  7. 2025When Chain of Thought is Necessary, Language Models Struggle to Evade Monitorscited by 81
  8. 2025ImpossibleBench: Measuring LLMs' Propensity of Exploiting Test Casescited by 51
  9. 2025Async Control: Stress-testing Asynchronous Control Measures for LLM Agentscited by 18
  10. 2025Incomplete Tasks Induce Shutdown Resistance in Some Frontier LLMscited by 16
  11. 2026Noticing the Watcher: LLM Agents Can Infer CoT Monitoring from Blocking Feedbackcited by 7
  12. 2026ROGUE: Evaluating Corrigibility Failures in Frontier Computer-Use Agentscited by 3

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