mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Detecting Safety Violations Across Many Agent Traces

arXiv 2604.11806 ↗First posted 13 Apr 2026cs.AI cs.CLcited by 14

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Abstract (arXiv)

To identify safety violations, auditors often search over large sets of agent traces. This search is difficult because failures are often rare, complex, and sometimes even adversarially hidden and only detectable when multiple traces are analyzed together. These challenges arise in diverse settings such as misuse campaigns, covert sabotage, reward hacking, and prompt injection. Existing approaches struggle here for several reasons. Per-trace judges miss failures that only become visible across traces, naive agentic auditing does not scale to large trace collections, and fixed monitors are brittle to unanticipated behaviors. We introduce Meerkat, which combines clustering with agentic search to uncover violations specified in natural language. Through structured search and adaptive investigation of promising regions, Meerkat finds sparse failures without relying on seed scenarios, fixed workflows, or exhaustive enumeration. Across misuse, misalignment, and task gaming settings, Meerkat significantly improves detection of safety violations over baseline monitors, discovers widespread developer cheating on a top agent benchmark, and finds nearly 4x more examples of reward hacking on CyBench than previous audits.

Key facts. Cited by 14 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 34 of its 61 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Apr 2026.

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34 of 61 references.

References · 34

  1. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
  2. 2022Red Teaming Language Models with Language Modelscited by 1,026
  3. 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 605
  4. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 529
  5. 2024The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearningcited by 509
  6. 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 384
  7. 2024Alignment faking in large language modelscited by 360
  8. 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 264
  9. 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversioncited by 229
  10. 2025Constitutional Classifiers: Defending against Universal Jailbreaks across Thousands of Hours of Red Teamingcited by 181
  11. 2024Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Modelscited by 164
  12. 2025Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agentscited by 158
22 more
  1. 2025Auditing language models for hidden objectivescited by 83
  2. 2025MELON: Provable Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in AI Agentscited by 77
  3. 2024Can Language Models Solve Olympiad Programming?cited by 72
  4. 2024Clio: Privacy-Preserving Insights into Real-World AI Usecited by 72
  5. 2025SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agentscited by 71
  6. 2025ImpossibleBench: Measuring LLMs' Propensity of Exploiting Test Casescited by 65
  7. 2025From Prompt Injections to Protocol Exploits: Threats in LLM-Powered AI Agents Workflowscited by 58
  8. 2025RepoAudit: An Autonomous LLM-Agent for Repository-Level Code Auditingcited by 49
  9. 2015Robust Online Monitoring of Signal Temporal Logiccited by 39
  10. 2026AuditBench: Evaluating Alignment Auditing Techniques on Models with Hidden Behaviorscited by 38
  11. 2024Adversaries Can Misuse Combinations of Safe Modelscited by 32
  12. 2024Adaptive Deployment of Untrusted LLMs Reduces Distributed Threatscited by 31
  13. 2025Reliable Weak-to-Strong Monitoring of LLM Agentscited by 31
  14. 2025Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competitioncited by 24
  15. 2025Async Control: Stress-testing Asynchronous Control Measures for LLM Agentscited by 22
  16. 2024Breach By A Thousand Leaks: Unsafe Information Leakage in `Safe' AI Responsescited by 18
  17. 2026Benchmarking Reward Hack Detection in Code Environments via Contrastive Analysiscited by 18
  18. 2025CTRL-ALT-DECEIT: Sabotage Evaluations for Automated AI R&Dcited by 15
  19. 2026How does information access affect LLM monitors' ability to detect sabotage?cited by 14
  20. 2026Constitutional Black-Box Monitoring for Scheming in LLM Agentscited by 10
  21. 2026AgentTrace: A Structured Logging Framework for Agent System Observabilitycited by 9
  22. 2025Benchmarking Misuse Mitigation Against Covert Adversariescited by 8

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  1. 2026RedAct: Redacting Agent Capability Traces for Procedural Skill Protection
  2. 2026Who Tests the Testers? Systematic Enumeration and Coverage Audit of LLM Agent Tool Call Safety
  3. 2026AgentForesight: Online Auditing for Early Failure Prediction in Multi-Agent Systems
  4. 2026VulnAgent-R2: Evidence-Calibrated Multi-Agent Auditing for Repository-Level Vulnerability Detection
  5. 2026SCOUT: Synergizing Reasoning and Tool-Use for Computer-Use Safety
  6. 2026SearchAuditor: Auditing and Attributing Failures in Long-Horizon Search Agents
  7. 2026BLADE: Auditing Information Use for Failure Attribution in LLM Multi-Agent Systems
  8. 2026ActBench: Self-Evolving Benchmark of Behavioral Safety in Cowork Agents