NEXUS: Structured Runtime Safety for Tool-Using LLM Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Tool-using LLM agents increasingly execute high-impact actions, making runtime safety monitoring essential. We present NEXUS (Neural EXecution Utility and Safety), a structured-plan safety monitor that applies a formal intervention policy to select among four actions: allow, block, request confirmation, or request revision. NEXUS combines deterministic safety rules, argument-level inspection, and a calibrated logistic-regression risk score for graded escalation. On a 128-instance synthetic benchmark, NEXUS achieves an F1 score of 0.949 and a 4-class intervention accuracy of 0.6406, outperforming rule-only intervention selection by 27.3 percentage points. It also improves over rule-only on R-Judge (F1 = 0.861 vs. 0.849), matches rule-only on AgentHarm due to threat-model limits, and achieves 0% ASR at 99% control allow on IPI. On the rule-blind NEXUS-Stress benchmark, NEXUS reaches an F1 score of 0.881, highlighting the difficulty of fine-grained intervention routing. With 0.205 ms median latency, NEXUS adds under 0.1% overhead to typical agent loops. Code, benchmarks, and the calibrated risk scorer are publicly released.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 15 of its 22 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 May 2026.
Builds on
15 of 22 references.
Closest ancestors · 11
Same direction, newest first
- 2026ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection13 Apr
- 2026Breaking the Protocol: Security Analysis of the Model Context Protocol Specification and Prompt Injection Vulnerabilities in Tool-Integrated LLM Agents24 Jan
- 2026ToolSafe: Enhancing Tool Invocation Safety of LLM-based agents via Proactive Step-level Guardrail and Feedback15 Jan
- 2025Enforcing Temporal Constraints for LLM Agents25 Dec
- 2025Trusted AI Agents in the Cloud5 Dec
- 2025VeriGuard: Enhancing LLM Agent Safety via Verified Code Generation3 Oct
- 2025LLM Agents Should Employ Security Principles29 May
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2025RTBAS: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection and Privacy Leakage13 Feb
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
- 2024The Emerged Security and Privacy of LLM Agent: A Survey with Case Studies28 Jul
Other references · 4
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
- 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 325
- 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 233
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026The Verifier Tax: Horizon Dependent Safety Success Tradeoffs in Tool Using LLM Agents
- 2026ATBench: A Diverse and Realistic Agent Trajectory Benchmark for Safety Evaluation and Diagnosis
- 2026AgentS4D: Benchmarking Runtime Risks across the Execution Lifecycle of LLM-Based Workspace Agents
- 2026Toward Safe LLM Agents: A Survey of Specification, Verification, and Enforcement
- 2026HARDE: Optimizing Agent Harnesses for Runtime Risk Detection and Execution Control
- 2026Unsafer in Many Turns: Benchmarking and Defending Multi-Turn Safety Risks in Tool-Using Agents
- 2026SafeCoEvo: Co-Evolving Safety Harnesses and Guards for LLM Agents at Test-Time
- 2026SafeAgent: A Runtime Protection Architecture for Agentic Systems