SoK: Trust-Authorization Mismatch in LLM Agent Interactions
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Large Language Models (LLMs) are evolving into autonomous agents capable of executing complex workflows via standardized protocols (e.g., MCP). However, this paradigm shifts control from deterministic code to probabilistic inference, creating a fundamental Trust-Authorization Mismatch: static permissions are structurally decoupled from the agent's fluctuating runtime trustworthiness. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK), we survey more than 200 representative papers to categorize the emerging landscape of agent security. We propose the Belief-Intention-Permission (B-I-P) framework as a unifying formal lens. By decomposing agent execution into three distinct stages-Belief Formation, Intent Generation, and Permission Grant-we demonstrate that diverse threats, from prompt injection to tool poisoning, share a common root cause: the desynchronization between dynamic trust states and static authorization boundaries. Using the B-I-P lens, we systematically map existing attacks and defenses and identify critical gaps where current mechanisms fail to bridge this mismatch. Finally, we outline a research agenda for shifting from static Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to dynamic, risk-adaptive authorization.
Key facts. Cited by 11 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 82 of its 134 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 7 Dec 2025.
Builds on
82 of 134 references.
Closest ancestors · 33
Same direction, newest first
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- 2025Automatic Red Teaming LLM-based Agents with Model Context Protocol Tools25 Sep
- 2025LLMZ+: Contextual Prompt Whitelist Principles for Agentic LLMs23 Sep
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- 2025AgentArmor: Enforcing Program Analysis on Agent Runtime Trace to Defend Against Prompt Injection2 Aug
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- 2025A survey of agent interoperability protocols: Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A), and Agent Network Protocol (ANP)4 May
- 2025Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents28 Apr
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- 2025StruPhantom: Evolutionary Injection Attacks on Black-Box Tabular Agents Powered by Large Language Models14 Apr
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- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
- 2024AutoDefense: Multi-Agent LLM Defense against Jailbreak Attacks2 Mar
- 2023Evil Geniuses: Delving into the Safety of LLM-based Agents20 Nov
Other references · 49
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- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,420
- 2023Gorilla: Large Language Model Connected with Massive APIscited by 1,332
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- 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defensescited by 364
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- 2024On the Resilience of LLM-Based Multi-Agent Collaboration with Faulty Agentscited by 99
- 2024System-Level Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks: An Information Flow Control Perspectivecited by 96
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- 2025HalluLens: LLM Hallucination Benchmarkcited by 92
- 2024Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreak Attacks via Layer-specific Editingcited by 79
- 2024Risk Taxonomy, Mitigation, and Assessment Benchmarks of Large Language Model Systemscited by 66
- 2025Collaborative Memory: Multi-User Memory Sharing in LLM Agents with Dynamic Access Controlcited by 61
- 2025LLM-based Agents Suffer from Hallucinations: A Survey of Taxonomy, Methods, and Directionscited by 50
- 2023The Persuasive Power of Large Language Modelscited by 47
- 2025Defending Against Prompt Injection with DataFiltercited by 35
- 2025Red Teaming the Mind of the Machine: A Systematic Evaluation of Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Vulnerabilities in LLMscited by 34
- 2025MCIP: Protecting MCP Safety via Model Contextual Integrity Protocolcited by 34
- 2024Embedding-based classifiers can detect prompt injection attackscited by 27
- 2025Multi-Agent Security Tax: Trading Off Security and Collaboration Capabilities in Multi-Agent Systemscited by 27
- 2024Unique Security and Privacy Threats of Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Surveycited by 23
- 2025GraphTracer: Graph-Guided Failure Tracing in LLM Agents for Robust Multi-Turn Deep Searchcited by 23
- 2021threaTrace: Detecting and Tracing Host-based Threats in Node Level Through Provenance Graph Learningcited by 22
- 2024Permissive Information-Flow Analysis for Large Language Modelscited by 22
- 2024Is the System Message Really Important to Jailbreaks in Large Language Models?cited by 20
- 2024Contextualized Sequence Likelihood: Enhanced Confidence Scores for Natural Language Generationcited by 16
- 2025VeriLA: A Human-Centered Evaluation Framework for Interpretable Verification of LLM Agent Failurescited by 14
- 2024Systematically Analyzing Prompt Injection Vulnerabilities in Diverse LLM Architecturescited by 12
- 2024Multi-Programming Language Sandbox for LLMscited by 10
- 2025Digital Forensics in the Age of Large Language Modelscited by 10
- 2024Intrusion Tolerance for Networked Systems through Two-Level Feedback Controlcited by 8
- 2024Generative AI Agents in Autonomous Machines: A Safety Perspectivecited by 7
- 2024LLM-Virus: Evolutionary Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Modelscited by 7
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 11.
11 papers.
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 7
- 2026Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?cited by 6
- 2026Agent-Fence: Mapping Security Vulnerabilities Across Deep Research Agentscited by 3
- 2026From Secure Agentic AI to Secure Agentic Web: Challenges, Threats, and Future Directionscited by 1
- 2026The Importance of Out-of-Band Metadata for Safe Autonomous Agents: The Redpanda Agentic Data Planecited by 1
- 2026SoK: When Safe Agents Fail Together: The Security of Multi Agent LLM Systemscited by 1
- 2026VATS: Exploiting Implicit Authority in Error-Path Injection via Systematic Mutationcited by 0
- 2026"Allow" to Achieve, Over-Privileged Inadvertently: The Unintended Cost of Task-Completion-Driven Pop-up Decisions in Mobile GUI Agentscited by 0
- 2026Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?cited by 0
- 2026When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systemscited by 0
- 2026SoK: Decentralized Agent Economic Infrastructurecited by 0
- 2026SoK: Decentralized Agent Economic Infrastructure1 Oct 2026
- 2026When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systems20 Sep 2026
- 2026SoK: When Safe Agents Fail Together: The Security of Multi Agent LLM Systems1 Sep 2026
- 2026Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?27 Aug 2026
- 2026"Allow" to Achieve, Over-Privileged Inadvertently: The Unintended Cost of Task-Completion-Driven Pop-up Decisions in Mobile GUI Agents5 Aug 2026
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation9 Jun 2026
- 2026VATS: Exploiting Implicit Authority in Error-Path Injection via Systematic Mutation6 Jun 2026
- 2026The Importance of Out-of-Band Metadata for Safe Autonomous Agents: The Redpanda Agentic Data Plane27 May 2026
- 2026Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?14 May 2026
- 2026From Secure Agentic AI to Secure Agentic Web: Challenges, Threats, and Future Directions2 Mar 2026
- 2026Agent-Fence: Mapping Security Vulnerabilities Across Deep Research Agents7 Feb 2026
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- 2025The Trust Paradox in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems: When Collaboration Becomes a Security Vulnerability
- 2026Hybrid Inspection and Task-Based Access Control in Zero-Trust Agentic AI
- 2026Taming Various Privilege Escalation in LLM-Based Agent Systems: A Mandatory Access Control Framework
- 2026LLM-Based Agents for Software and Systems Security: Approaches, Applications, and Assessment