VATS: Exploiting Implicit Authority in Error-Path Injection via Systematic Mutation
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
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Abstract (arXiv)
As the Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes tool-calling for autonomous agents, it introduces a critical, unexamined attack surface: the error-handling loop. We hypothesize that tool error messages possess implicit authority, triggering corrective reasoning modes that bypass standard safety heuristics. We introduce VATS (Vulnerability Analysis of Tool Streams), a mutation-driven framework that systematically evolves adversarial payloads across seven structural and linguistic dimensions. Our evaluation across four frontier models, Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.5, GLM-5.1, and Qwen3-Coder, demonstrates that error-path injection triples the success rate of standard indirect prompt injection (IPI), achieving up to 100% compliance in controlled evaluations. We isolate structural positioning (sandwiching instructions within error context) as the most effective exploit vector across all tested models. While we find that production framework guardrails can mitigate these vulnerabilities, the inherent susceptibility of the model layer poses a systemic risk to bespoke agentic workflows.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 18 of its 36 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 Jun 2026.
Builds on
18 of 36 references.
Closest ancestors · 8
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models22 Apr
- 2026Breaking the Protocol: Security Analysis of the Model Context Protocol Specification and Prompt Injection Vulnerabilities in Tool-Integrated LLM Agents24 Jan
- 2026Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale15 Jan
- 2026VIGIL: Defending LLM Agents Against Tool Stream Injection via Verify-Before-Commit9 Jan
- 2025It's a TRAP! Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark for Web Agents29 Dec
- 2025SoK: Trust-Authorization Mismatch in LLM Agent Interactions7 Dec
- 2025In-Browser LLM-Guided Fuzzing for Real-Time Prompt Injection Testing in Agentic AI Browsers15 Oct
- 2025Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents27 Feb
Other references · 10
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,393
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
- 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,072
- 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,880
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2024Tool-Planner: Task Planning with Clusters across Multiple Toolscited by 32
- 2025Control Illusion: The Failure of Instruction Hierarchies in Large Language Modelscited by 31
- 2025One Shot Dominance: Knowledge Poisoning Attack on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systemscited by 28
- 2025The Illusion of Role Separation: Hidden Shortcuts in LLM Role Learning (and How to Fix Them)cited by 6
- 2025HASHIRU: Hierarchical Agent System for Hybrid Intelligent Resource Utilizationcited by 2
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- 2026AgentDrift: A Step-Labeled Benchmark of Injection-Hijacked LLM Agent Trajectories
- 2026Adversarial Pragmatics for AI Safety Evaluation: A Diagnostic Framework and Seed Benchmark for Language-Mediated Control
- 2025EVA: Evolving Semantic Adversaries for Red-Teaming GUI Agents Against Environmental Injection Attacks