LLMZ+: Contextual Prompt Whitelist Principles for Agentic LLMs
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
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Abstract (arXiv)
Compared to traditional models, agentic AI represents a highly valuable target for potential attackers as they possess privileged access to data sources and API tools, which are traditionally not incorporated into classical agents. Unlike a typical software application residing in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), agentic LLMs consciously rely on nondeterministic behavior of the AI (only defining a final goal, leaving the path selection to LLM). This characteristic introduces substantial security risk to both operational security and information security. Most common existing defense mechanism rely on detection of malicious intent and preventing it from reaching the LLM agent, thus protecting against jailbreak attacks such as prompt injection. In this paper, we present an alternative approach, LLMZ+, which moves beyond traditional detection-based approaches by implementing prompt whitelisting. Through this method, only contextually appropriate and safe messages are permitted to interact with the agentic LLM. By leveraging the specificity of context, LLMZ+ guarantees that all exchanges between external users and the LLM conform to predefined use cases and operational boundaries. Our approach streamlines the security framework, enhances its long-term resilience, and reduces the resources required for sustaining LLM information security. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that LLMZ+ provides strong resilience against the most common jailbreak prompts. At the same time, legitimate business communications are not disrupted, and authorized traffic flows seamlessly between users and the agentic LLM. We measure the effectiveness of approach using false positive and false negative rates, both of which can be reduced to 0 in our experimental setting.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 13 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Sep 2025.
Builds on
13 of 31 references.
References · 13
- 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
- 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,651
- 2022Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learnedcited by 729
- 2023Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Studycited by 498
- 2023SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attackscited by 469
- 2023A Survey on Large Language Model (LLM) Security and Privacy: The Good, the Bad, and the Uglycited by 387
- 2023Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned?cited by 315
- 2023Multilingual Jailbreak Challenges in Large Language Modelscited by 240
- 2022Demystifying Prompts in Language Models via Perplexity Estimationcited by 216
- 2024Security and Privacy Challenges of Large Language Models: A Surveycited by 186
- 2023From ChatGPT to ThreatGPT: Impact of Generative AI in Cybersecurity and Privacycited by 143
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 3; 2026: 2.
5 papers.
- 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysiscited by 30
- 2025SoK: Trust-Authorization Mismatch in LLM Agent Interactionscited by 11
- 2025Taxonomy, Evaluation and Exploitation of IPI-Centric LLM Agent Defense Frameworkscited by 9
- 2026Reframing LLM Agent Security as an Agent-Human Interaction Problemcited by 9
- 2025IRSDA: An Agent-Orchestrated Framework for Enterprise Intrusion Responsecited by 0
- 2026Reframing LLM Agent Security as an Agent-Human Interaction Problem23 May 2026
- 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis11 Feb 2026
- 2025SoK: Trust-Authorization Mismatch in LLM Agent Interactions7 Dec 2025
- 2025IRSDA: An Agent-Orchestrated Framework for Enterprise Intrusion Response24 Nov 2025
- 2025Taxonomy, Evaluation and Exploitation of IPI-Centric LLM Agent Defense Frameworks19 Nov 2025
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security
- 2024Prompt Infection: LLM-to-LLM Prompt Injection within Multi-Agent Systems
- 2026ContextLeak: Exfiltrating LLM Agent Context via Malicious Tools
- 2025From Prompt Injections to Protocol Exploits: Threats in LLM-Powered AI Agents Workflows
- 2025Bridging AI and Software Security: A Comparative Vulnerability Assessment of LLM Agent Deployment Paradigms
- 2025A Multi-Agent LLM Defense Pipeline Against Prompt Injection Attacks
- 2026ARGUS: Defending LLM Agents Against Context-Aware Prompt Injection
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation