STREAM (ChemBio): A Standard for Transparently Reporting Evaluations in AI Model Reports
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Abstract (arXiv)
Evaluations of dangerous AI capabilities are important for managing catastrophic risks. Public transparency into these evaluations - including what they test, how they are conducted, and how their results inform decisions - is crucial for building trust in AI development. We propose STREAM (A Standard for Transparently Reporting Evaluations in AI Model Reports), a standard to improve how model reports disclose evaluation results, initially focusing on chemical and biological (ChemBio) benchmarks. Developed in consultation with 23 experts across government, civil society, academia, and frontier AI companies, this standard is designed to (1) be a practical resource to help AI developers present evaluation results more clearly, and (2) help third parties identify whether model reports provide sufficient detail to assess the rigor of the ChemBio evaluations. We concretely demonstrate our proposed best practices with "gold standard" examples, and also provide a three-page reporting template to enable AI developers to implement our recommendations more easily.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 50 of its 144 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Aug 2025.
Builds on
50 of 144 references.
References · 50
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 9.
10 papers.
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