Best of Both Worlds: Regret Minimization versus Minimax Play
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Abstract (arXiv)
In this paper, we investigate the existence of online learning algorithms with bandit feedback that simultaneously guarantee O(1) regret compared to a given comparator strategy, and tildeO(√T) regret compared to any fixed strategy, where T is the number of rounds. We provide the first affirmative answer to this question whenever the comparator strategy supports every action. In the context of zero-sum games with min-max value zero, both in normal- and extensive form, we show that our results allow us to guarantee to risk at most O(1) loss while being able to gain Omega(T) from exploitable opponents, thereby combining the benefits of both no-regret algorithms and minimax play.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 34 of its 57 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Feb 2025.
Builds on
34 of 57 references.
References · 34
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22 more
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
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