mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

SeClaw: Spec-Driven Security Task Synthesis for Evaluating Autonomous Agents

arXiv 2606.02302 ↗First posted 1 Jun 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 1

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Autonomous LLM agents increasingly operate in stateful environments where they access tools, files, memory, and external services. While such capabilities enable complex real-world workflows, they also introduce security risks that are difficult to capture with existing evaluations. Current agent security benchmarks often rely on manually curated tasks, provide limited coverage of emerging threats, and focus primarily on final outcomes rather than the execution processes that lead to unsafe behavior. We introduce SeClaw, a framework that combines specification-driven security task synthesis with execution-based security evaluation for Autonomous agents. Spec-driven security task synthesis enables scalable and controllable construction of security tasks from structured risk specifications, while SeClaw docker provides a standardized testbed for evaluating agent behavior under diverse safety-risk scenarios. The benchmark covers risks arising from resources, user tasks, environments, and intrinsic agent behaviors, and supports trajectory-aware assessment of unsafe actions beyond final responses. By bridging systematic task synthesis and reproducible security evaluation, SeClaw provides a practical foundation for measuring, diagnosing, and comparing security failures in autonomous LLM agents. The code is available at https://github.com/seclaw-eval/seclaw-eval.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 32 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Jun 2026.

Builds on

32 of 41 references.

Closest ancestors · 22

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026HINTBench: Horizon-agent Intrinsic Non-attack Trajectory Benchmark15 Apr
  2. 2026How Your Credentials Are Leaked by LLM Agent Skills: An Empirical Study3 Apr
  3. 2026ClawTrap: A MITM-Based Red-Teaming Framework for Real-World OpenClaw Security Evaluation19 Mar
  4. 2026Taming OpenClaw: Security Analysis and Mitigation of Autonomous LLM Agent Threats12 Mar
  5. 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks23 Feb
  6. 2026MalTool: Malicious Tool Attacks on LLM Agents12 Feb
  7. 2025ObliInjection: Order-Oblivious Prompt Injection Attack to LLM Agents with Multi-source Data10 Dec
  8. 2025Investigating the Impact of Dark Patterns on LLM-Based Web Agents20 Oct
  9. 2025AgentSentinel: An End-to-End and Real-Time Security Defense Framework for Computer-Use Agents9 Sep
  10. 2025Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition28 Jul
  11. 2025Simple Prompt Injection Attacks Can Leak Personal Data Observed by LLM Agents During Task Execution1 Jun
  12. 2025MPMA: Preference Manipulation Attack Against Model Context Protocol16 May
10 more
  1. 2025Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents28 Apr
  2. 2025SAGA: A Security Architecture for Governing AI Agentic Systems27 Apr
  3. 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
  4. 2025textitAgents Under Siege: Breaking Pragmatic Multi-Agent LLM Systems with Optimized Prompt Attacks31 Mar
  5. 2025Prompt Flow Integrity to Prevent Privilege Escalation in LLM Agents17 Mar
  6. 2025A Survey on Trustworthy LLM Agents: Threats and Countermeasures12 Mar
  7. 2025Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memory17 Feb
  8. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
  9. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
  10. 2024BadRobot: Jailbreaking Embodied LLM Agents in the Physical World16 Jul

Other references · 10

  1. 2023A Survey of Large Language Modelscited by 2,576
  2. 2025Large Language Model Agent: A Survey on Methodology, Applications and Challengescited by 205
  3. 2024Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attack to LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 143
  4. 2026Agent Skills for Large Language Models: Architecture, Acquisition, Security, and the Path Forwardcited by 113
  5. 2026Claw-Eval: Towards Trustworthy Evaluation of Autonomous Agentscited by 64
  6. 2026Don't Let the Claw Grip Your Hand: A Security Analysis and Defense Framework for OpenClawcited by 29
  7. 2025LLMail-Inject: A Dataset from a Realistic Adaptive Prompt Injection Challengecited by 21
  8. 2025Towards Automating Data Access Permissions in AI Agentscited by 21
  9. 2026ClawKeeper: Comprehensive Safety Protection for OpenClaw Agents Through Skills, Plugins, and Watcherscited by 20
  10. 2026Benchmarks for Trajectory Safety Evaluation and Diagnosis in OpenClaw and Codex: ATBench-Claw and ATBench-Codexcited by 6

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026ClawSentry: A Progressive Multi-Tier Security Monitor for Safeguarding Autonomous LLM Agents
  2. 2026ASEval: Automated Trajectory-Level Security Testing for Autonomous Agents
  3. 2025SEC-bench: Automated Benchmarking of LLM Agents on Real-World Software Security Tasks
  4. 2026Measuring Safety Alignment Effects in Autonomous Security Agents
  5. 2026LLM-Based Agents for Software and Systems Security: Approaches, Applications, and Assessment
  6. 2025AgentGuard: Repurposing Agentic Orchestrator for Safety Evaluation of Tool Orchestration
  7. 2026Security Attack and Defense Strategies for Autonomous Agent Frameworks: A Layered Review with OpenClaw as a Case Study
  8. 2026Towards Security-Auditable LLM Agents: A Unified Graph Representation