mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

AgentGuard: Repurposing Agentic Orchestrator for Safety Evaluation of Tool Orchestration

arXiv 2502.09809 ↗First posted 13 Feb 2025cs.CR cs.AIcited by 25

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

The integration of tool use into large language models (LLMs) enables agentic systems with real-world impact. In the meantime, unlike standalone LLMs, compromised agents can execute malicious workflows with more consequential impact, signified by their tool-use capability. We propose AgentGuard, a framework to autonomously discover and validate unsafe tool-use workflows, followed by generating safety constraints to confine the behaviors of agents, achieving the baseline of safety guarantee at deployment. AgentGuard leverages the LLM orchestrator's innate capabilities - knowledge of tool functionalities, scalable and realistic workflow generation, and tool execution privileges - to act as its own safety evaluator. The framework operates through four phases: identifying unsafe workflows, validating them in real-world execution, generating safety constraints, and validating constraint efficacy. The output, an evaluation report with unsafe workflows, test cases, and validated constraints, enables multiple security applications. We empirically demonstrate AgentGuard's feasibility with experiments. With this exploratory work, we hope to inspire the establishment of standardized testing and hardening procedures for LLM agents to enhance their trustworthiness in real-world applications.

Key facts. Cited by 25 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 1 of its 6 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Feb 2025.

Builds on

1 of 6 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 10; 2026: 15.

25 papers.

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  1. 2025Model Context Protocol (MCP): Landscape, Security Threats, and Future Research Directionscited by 257
  2. 2025A Comprehensive Survey in LLM(-Agent) Full Stack Safety: Data, Training and Deploymentcited by 110
  3. 2025A Survey on Trustworthy LLM Agents: Threats and Countermeasurescited by 93
  4. 2025A Survey of LLM-Driven AI Agent Communication: Protocols, Security Risks, and Defense Countermeasurescited by 54
  5. 2026AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purificationcited by 28
  6. 2025AgentSentinel: An End-to-End and Real-Time Security Defense Framework for Computer-Use Agentscited by 25
  7. 2025WebGuard: Building a Generalizable Guardrail for Web Agentscited by 20
  8. 2025BlockA2A: Towards Secure and Verifiable Agent-to-Agent Interoperabilitycited by 14
  9. 2025Who's the Mole? Modeling and Detecting Intention-Hiding Malicious Agents in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systemscited by 12
  10. 2026ChainCaps: Composition-Safe Tool-Using Agents via Monotonic Capability Attenuationcited by 11
  11. 2026AgentStepper: Interactive Debugging of Software Development Agentscited by 8
  12. 2026SOK: A Taxonomy of Attack Vectors and Defense Strategies for Agentic Supply Chain Runtimecited by 8
13 more
  1. 2026Visual Confused Deputy: Exploiting and Defending Perception Failures in Computer-Using Agentscited by 7
  2. 2026Agentic Trading: When LLM Agents Meet Financial Marketscited by 7
  3. 2025Agentic Services Computingcited by 6
  4. 2026Autonomous Research Agents: A Survey of AI Scientists and the Verification Gapcited by 6
  5. 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 5
  6. 2026MCPShield: A Security Cognition Layer for Adaptive Trust Calibration in Model Context Protocol Agentscited by 3
  7. 2025GAF-Guard: An Agentic Framework for Risk Management and Governance in Large Language Modelscited by 2
  8. 2026Differential Harm Propensity in Personalized LLM Agents: The Curious Case of Mental Health Disclosurecited by 2
  9. 2026Enhancing Safety of Large Language Models via Embedding Space Separationcited by 2
  10. 2026From Secure Agentic AI to Secure Agentic Web: Challenges, Threats, and Future Directionscited by 1
  11. 2026Isolation as a First-Class Principle for LLM-Agent System Safety: Concepts, Taxonomy, Challenges and Future Directionscited by 1
  12. 2026GuardianAgentBench: Where Agents Fail and How to Guard Themcited by 1
  13. 2026HazardAuditor: From Executable Threats to Safer Computer-Use Agentscited by 0

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Tool Specifications Matter: Uncovering and Mitigating Safety Risks in AI Agents
  2. 2026Who Tests the Testers? Systematic Enumeration and Coverage Audit of LLM Agent Tool Call Safety
  3. 2026AgenTRIM: Tool Risk Mitigation for Agentic AI
  4. 2026Agentao: A Policy-Governed Runtime Harness for Embeddable Tool-Using LLM Agents
  5. 2026AgentFlow: A Flow-Centric Policy Language and Framework for Securing LLM Agent Systems
  6. 2026AgentGuard: An Attribute-Based Access Control Framework for Tool-Use LLM-Based Agent
  7. 2026S3: Improving Agent Safety through Multi-Stage Defense
  8. 2025A Safety and Security Framework for Real-World Agentic Systems