mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Accelerated regularized learning in finite N-person games

arXiv 2412.20365 ↗First posted 29 Dec 2024cs.GT cs.LG math.OCcited by 2

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Abstract (arXiv)

Motivated by the success of Nesterov's accelerated gradient algorithm for convex minimization problems, we examine whether it is possible to achieve similar performance gains in the context of online learning in games. To that end, we introduce a family of accelerated learning methods, which we call "follow the accelerated leader" (FTXL), and which incorporates the use of momentum within the general framework of regularized learning - and, in particular, the exponential/multiplicative weights algorithm and its variants. Drawing inspiration and techniques from the continuous-time analysis of Nesterov's algorithm, we show that FTXL converges locally to strict Nash equilibria at a superlinear rate, achieving in this way an exponential speed-up over vanilla regularized learning methods (which, by comparison, converge to strict equilibria at a geometric, linear rate). Importantly, FTXL maintains its superlinear convergence rate in a broad range of feedback structures, from deterministic, full information models to stochastic, realization-based ones, and even when run with bandit, payoff-based information, where players are only able to observe their individual realized payoffs.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 20 of its 44 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Dec 2024.

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20 of 44 references.

References · 20

  1. 2014Convex Optimization: Algorithms and Complexitycited by 569
  2. 2015A Differential Equation for Modeling Nesterov's Accelerated Gradient Method: Theory and Insightscited by 203
  3. 2015Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Gamescited by 149
  4. 2017Cycles in adversarial regularized learningcited by 122
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  6. 2014Linear Coupling: An Ultimate Unification of Gradient and Mirror Descentcited by 58
  7. 2021Adaptive Learning in Continuous Games: Optimal Regret Bounds and Convergence to Nash Equilibriumcited by 51
  8. 2020No-regret learning and mixed Nash equilibria: They do not mixcited by 49
  9. 2021Survival of the strictest: Stable and unstable equilibria under regularized learning with partial informationcited by 22
  10. 2022A unified stochastic approximation framework for learning in gamescited by 22
  11. 2016Riemannian game dynamicscited by 18
  12. 2018On Passivity, Reinforcement Learning and Higher-Order Learning in Multi-Agent Finite Gamescited by 8
8 more
  1. 2014On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observationscited by 7
  2. 2021Learning in nonatomic games, Part I: Finite action spaces and population gamescited by 6
  3. 2023The equivalence of dynamic and strategic stability under regularized learning in gamescited by 4
  4. 2013Inertial game dynamics and applications to constrained optimizationcited by 2
  5. 2016Passivity Analysis of Higher Order Evolutionary Dynamics and Population Gamescited by 2
  6. 2023Higher-Order Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium -- Except When They Docited by 2
  7. 2021Second-Order Mirror Descent: Convergence in Games Beyond Averaging and Discountingcited by 1
  8. 2022Learning in Games with Quantized Payoff Observationscited by 1

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Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 1.

2 papers.