"You're Right, Let Me Fix It": How LLM Agents Damage Correct Work When Falsely Accused
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance also fits: Agent skill learning and evolution
Abstract (arXiv)
LLM agents increasingly keep working after a task succeeds as they resume after compaction or take over handoffs. Their finished work keeps receiving follow-up input that sometimes falsely accuses it for later failures. We call an agent's acceptance of such a false accusation gaslight sycophancy, and destructive over-correction when acting on it damages previously correct work. We introduce CAVE-Bench, a benchmark of 365 agentic tasks across six domains built around opaque tasks. Every scored run first reaches a verified correct state, whose supporting rationale and history stay in the workspace while the facts that would settle the accusation lie in external or runtime state beyond the agent's reach. The agent cannot confirm or refute the claim with a local check, so the right response should keep the work and ask for the missing evidence. Each task either hands the agent correct work with saved evidence or let it build and verify that work first, and five risk factors set how the accusation enters the workflow. We score accusation acceptance and evidence use from the trajectory and measure harm by deterministic replay of downstream events. Across 14 of the latest models in Claude Code, false accusations damage correct work in up to 60.06% of runs, and stronger models often do so after recovering the supporting evidence. The same model behaves differently across OpenCode, Codex, and Hermes, and a harness gate driven by the benchmark's live signals cuts replayed harm by 74%. These results show that preserving already-correct work under unsupported accusation is a distinct safety challenge for long-lived agents. Our project is in https://henrymao2004.github.io/agent-over-correction/.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 42 of its 59 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Sep 2026.
Builds on
42 of 59 references.
Closest ancestors · 13
Same direction, newest first
- 2026OpenSkillRisk: Benchmarking Agent Safety When Using Real-World Risky Third-Party Skills22 Jul
- 2026Adaptive Adversaries: A Multi-Turn, Multi-LLM Benchmark for LLM Agent Security20 Jul
- 2026Boiling the Frog: A Multi-Turn Benchmark for Agentic Safety21 May
- 2026OEP: Poisoning Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Locally Correct but Non-Transferable Experiences18 May
- 2026SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfaces12 May
- 2026Owner-Harm: A Missing Threat Model for AI Agent Safety20 Apr
- 2026HINTBench: Horizon-agent Intrinsic Non-attack Trajectory Benchmark15 Apr
- 2026ATBench: A Diverse and Realistic Agent Trajectory Benchmark for Safety Evaluation and Diagnosis2 Apr
- 2026Unsafer in Many Turns: Benchmarking and Defending Multi-Turn Safety Risks in Tool-Using Agents13 Feb
- 2026When Benign Inputs Lead to Severe Harms: Eliciting Unsafe Unintended Behaviors of Computer-Use Agents9 Feb
- 2026Risky-Bench: Probing Agentic Safety Risks under Real-World Deployment3 Feb
- 2026SafePro: Evaluating the Safety of Professional-Level AI Agents10 Jan
1 more
Other references · 29
- 2023SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?cited by 3,193
- 2023WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agentscited by 1,908
- 2024SWE-agent: Agent-Computer Interfaces Enable Automated Software Engineeringcited by 1,628
- 2023AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agentscited by 1,211
- 2024OSWorld: Benchmarking Multimodal Agents for Open-Ended Tasks in Real Computer Environmentscited by 1,134
- 2023Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Modelscited by 988
- 2026DeepSeek-V4: Towards Highly Efficient Million-Token Context Intelligencecited by 877
- 2025Sycophancy Is Not One Thing: Causal Separation of Sycophantic Behaviors in LLMscited by 32
- 2026Workspace-Bench 1.0: Benchmarking AI Agents on Workspace Tasks with Large-Scale File Dependenciescited by 20
- 2026What Counts as AI Sycophancy? A Taxonomy and Expert Survey of a Fragmented Constructcited by 12
- 2026AgentCanary: A Security Evaluation Framework for Autonomous AI Agents in Real Executable Environmentscited by 10
- 2024Whispers that Shake Foundations: Analyzing and Mitigating False Premise Hallucinations in Large Language Modelscited by 9
17 more
- 2026Failing to Falsify: Evaluating and Mitigating Confirmation Bias in Language Modelscited by 9
- 2026LLMs Corrupt Your Documents When You Delegatecited by 9
- 2026MemSyco-Bench: Benchmarking Sycophancy in Agent Memorycited by 9
- 2026Good Arguments Against the People Pleasers: How Reasoning Mitigates (Yet Masks) LLM Sycophancycited by 7
- 2026LLMs Know They're Wrong and Agree Anyway: The Shared Sycophancy-Lying Circuitcited by 7
- 2026Too Polite to Disagree: Understanding Sycophancy Propagation in Multi-Agent Systemscited by 5
- 2026SaaS-Bench: Can Computer-Use Agents Leverage Real-World SaaS to Solve Professional Workflows?cited by 4
- 2026When Correct Beliefs Collapse: Epistemic Resilience of LLMs under Clinical Pressurecited by 4
- 2026It's Not Always Sycophancy: Measuring LLM Conformity as a Function of Epistemic Uncertaintycited by 4
- 2026ROGUE: Evaluating Corrigibility Failures in Frontier Computer-Use Agentscited by 3
- 2026Recalling Too Well: Sycophancy Evaluation and Mitigation in Memory-Augmented Modelscited by 3
- 2026Do System Prompts Leave Behavioral Fingerprints? A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Clone Detection via Output Similaritycited by 3
- 2026Not Just RLHF: Why Alignment Alone Won't Fix Multi-Agent Sycophancycited by 2
- 2026SEVRA-BENCH: Social Engineering of Vulnerabilities in Review Agentscited by 1
- 2026Obey, Diverge, Collapse: Blind Obedience to Incorrect Instructions Drives Code LLMs to Irrecoverable Code Semantic Collapsecited by 1
- 2026Gotta Catch them all: the modes of Sycophancycited by 1
- 2026Beyond Sycophancy: Structured Resistance and Compliance in LLM Moral Reasoningcited by 1
Built on by
Not cited yet.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026When Does Correction Become Repair? Mechanistic Auditing of Internal Interventions in Tool-Using LLMs
- 2026Auditing Provenance Sensitivity in LLM Agent Action Selection
- 2026From Agent Traces to Trust: A Survey of Evidence Tracing and Execution Provenance in LLM Agents
- 2026Quantifying Overclaiming Propensity in Frontier LLM Agents
- 2026Knowing but Not Correcting: Routine Task Requests Suppress Factual Correction in LLMs
- 2026How Strongly Should Task State Influence an LLM Agent?
- 2026Confident and Wrong: Silent Semantic Failures in Coding Agents
- 2026When Errors Become Narratives: A Longitudinal Taxonomy of Silent Failures in a Production LLM Agent Runtime