mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

When Benign Inputs Lead to Severe Harms: Eliciting Unsafe Unintended Behaviors of Computer-Use Agents

arXiv 2602.08235 ↗First posted 9 Feb 2026cs.CL cs.AI cs.CRcited by 13

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts. However, exploration of this risk remains largely anecdotal, lacking concrete characterization and automated methods to proactively surface long-tail unintended behaviors under realistic CUA scenarios. To fill this gap, we introduce the first conceptual and methodological framework for unintended CUA behaviors, by defining their key characteristics, automatically eliciting them, and analyzing how they arise from benign inputs. We propose AutoElicit: an agentic framework that iteratively perturbs benign instructions using CUA execution feedback, and elicits severe harms while keeping perturbations realistic and benign. Using AutoElicit, we surface hundreds of harmful unintended behaviors from state-of-the-art CUAs such as Claude 4.5 Haiku, Claude 4.5 Opus, and Operator. We further evaluate the transferability of human-verified successful perturbations, identifying persistent susceptibility to unintended behaviors across various other frontier CUAs. This work establishes a foundation for systematically analyzing unintended behaviors in realistic computer-use settings.

Key facts. Cited by 13 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 31 of its 86 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Feb 2026.

Builds on

31 of 86 references.

Closest ancestors · 4

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Your Harness is Not Secure: Benchmarking Real-world Threat of Command Line Interface Agent8 Oct
  2. 2025Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threats5 Oct
  3. 2025LlamaFirewall: An open source guardrail system for building secure AI agents6 May
  4. 2025Progent: Securing AI Agents with Privilege Control16 Apr

Other references · 27

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  6. 2025Magentic-UI: Towards Human-in-the-loop Agentic Systemscited by 41
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  12. 2025Scaling Agents for Computer Usecited by 14
  13. 2024Challenges in Human-Agent Communicationcited by 11
  14. 2025AI Safety vs. AI Security: Demystifying the Distinction and Boundariescited by 5
  15. 2025Eliciting Behaviors in Multi-Turn Conversationscited by 4

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 13.

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  1. 2026AgentHazard: A Benchmark for Evaluating Harmful Behavior in Computer-Use Agents
  2. 2026When Actions Go Off-Task: Detecting and Correcting Misaligned Actions in Computer-Use Agents
  3. 2025OS-Harm: A Benchmark for Measuring Safety of Computer Use Agents
  4. 2026ADeptS-Bench: Measuring the Trustworthiness of Computer Use Agents Across Devices
  5. 2025OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety
  6. 2026HazardAuditor: From Executable Threats to Safer Computer-Use Agents
  7. 2026ActBench: Self-Evolving Benchmark of Behavioral Safety in Cowork Agents
  8. 2026ParanoiaEval: Benchmarking Unnecessary Defensive Work in Agentic Coding