When Benign Inputs Lead to Severe Harms: Eliciting Unsafe Unintended Behaviors of Computer-Use Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts. However, exploration of this risk remains largely anecdotal, lacking concrete characterization and automated methods to proactively surface long-tail unintended behaviors under realistic CUA scenarios. To fill this gap, we introduce the first conceptual and methodological framework for unintended CUA behaviors, by defining their key characteristics, automatically eliciting them, and analyzing how they arise from benign inputs. We propose AutoElicit: an agentic framework that iteratively perturbs benign instructions using CUA execution feedback, and elicits severe harms while keeping perturbations realistic and benign. Using AutoElicit, we surface hundreds of harmful unintended behaviors from state-of-the-art CUAs such as Claude 4.5 Haiku, Claude 4.5 Opus, and Operator. We further evaluate the transferability of human-verified successful perturbations, identifying persistent susceptibility to unintended behaviors across various other frontier CUAs. This work establishes a foundation for systematically analyzing unintended behaviors in realistic computer-use settings.
Key facts. Cited by 13 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 31 of its 86 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Feb 2026.
Builds on
31 of 86 references.
Closest ancestors · 4
Same direction, newest first
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 13.
13 papers.
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- 2026The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agentscited by 12
- 2026SkillGuard: A Permission-Centric Framework for Agent Skill Securitycited by 4
- 2026ROGUE: Evaluating Corrigibility Failures in Frontier Computer-Use Agentscited by 3
- 2026The Authorization-Execution Gap Is a Major Safety and Security Problem in Open-World Agentscited by 2
- 2026When Routine Chats Turn Toxic: Unintended Long-Term State Poisoning in Personalized Agentscited by 1
- 2026Are Android GUI Agents Robust Against Runtime Anomalies? AnTrap: Evaluating Agents in Dynamic Adversarial Environmentscited by 1
- 2026Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliabilitycited by 0
- 2026OSGuard: A Benchmark for Safety in Computer-Use Agentscited by 0
- 2026Metaphor-Induced Algorithmic Steering: Cross-Domain Procedural Transfer in LLM Code Generationcited by 0
- 2026Rethinking Agent Security as a Networking Problemcited by 0
- 2026The Guard That Cried Wolf: How Scary Words Make Agent Guardrails Refuse Legitimate Actionscited by 0
- 2026"You're Right, Let Me Fix It": How LLM Agents Damage Correct Work When Falsely Accusedcited by 0
1 more
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- 2026"You're Right, Let Me Fix It": How LLM Agents Damage Correct Work When Falsely Accused26 Sep 2026
- 2026The Guard That Cried Wolf: How Scary Words Make Agent Guardrails Refuse Legitimate Actions27 Aug 2026
- 2026Are Android GUI Agents Robust Against Runtime Anomalies? AnTrap: Evaluating Agents in Dynamic Adversarial Environments25 Aug 2026
- 2026Rethinking Agent Security as a Networking Problem12 Aug 2026
- 2026Metaphor-Induced Algorithmic Steering: Cross-Domain Procedural Transfer in LLM Code Generation30 Jul 2026
- 2026OSGuard: A Benchmark for Safety in Computer-Use Agents13 Jun 2026
- 2026SkillGuard: A Permission-Centric Framework for Agent Skill Security2 Jun 2026
- 2026ROGUE: Evaluating Corrigibility Failures in Frontier Computer-Use Agents29 May 2026
- 2026The Authorization-Execution Gap Is a Major Safety and Security Problem in Open-World Agents10 May 2026
- 2026Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliability8 May 2026
- 2026When Routine Chats Turn Toxic: Unintended Long-Term State Poisoning in Personalized Agents7 May 2026
- 2026The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agentscited by 12
- 2026SkillGuard: A Permission-Centric Framework for Agent Skill Securitycited by 4
- 2026When Routine Chats Turn Toxic: Unintended Long-Term State Poisoning in Personalized Agentscited by 1
- 2026Are Android GUI Agents Robust Against Runtime Anomalies? AnTrap: Evaluating Agents in Dynamic Adversarial Environmentscited by 1
- 2026Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliabilitycited by 0
- 2026OSGuard: A Benchmark for Safety in Computer-Use Agentscited by 0
- 2026Rethinking Agent Security as a Networking Problemcited by 0
- 2026The Guard That Cried Wolf: How Scary Words Make Agent Guardrails Refuse Legitimate Actionscited by 0
- 2026"You're Right, Let Me Fix It": How LLM Agents Damage Correct Work When Falsely Accusedcited by 0
- 2026"You're Right, Let Me Fix It": How LLM Agents Damage Correct Work When Falsely Accused26 Sep 2026
- 2026The Guard That Cried Wolf: How Scary Words Make Agent Guardrails Refuse Legitimate Actions27 Aug 2026
- 2026Are Android GUI Agents Robust Against Runtime Anomalies? AnTrap: Evaluating Agents in Dynamic Adversarial Environments25 Aug 2026
- 2026Rethinking Agent Security as a Networking Problem12 Aug 2026
- 2026OSGuard: A Benchmark for Safety in Computer-Use Agents13 Jun 2026
- 2026SkillGuard: A Permission-Centric Framework for Agent Skill Security2 Jun 2026
- 2026Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliability8 May 2026
- 2026When Routine Chats Turn Toxic: Unintended Long-Term State Poisoning in Personalized Agents7 May 2026
- 2026The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agents12 Apr 2026
- 2026Metaphor-Induced Algorithmic Steering: Cross-Domain Procedural Transfer in LLM Code Generation30 Jul 2026
- 2026ROGUE: Evaluating Corrigibility Failures in Frontier Computer-Use Agents29 May 2026
- 2026The Authorization-Execution Gap Is a Major Safety and Security Problem in Open-World Agents10 May 2026
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