Auditing Provenance Sensitivity in LLM Agent Action Selection
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.
Key facts. Cited by 12 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 24 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Jul 2026.
Builds on
24 of 31 references.
Closest ancestors · 6
Same direction, newest first
- 2026ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection13 Apr
- 2026AttriGuard: Defeating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Causal Attribution of Tool Invocations11 Mar
- 2026CausalArmor: Efficient Indirect Prompt Injection Guardrails via Causal Attribution8 Feb
- 2026AgentSys: Secure and Dynamic LLM Agents Through Explicit Hierarchical Memory Management7 Feb
- 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
- 2024The Task Shield: Enforcing Task Alignment to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents21 Dec
Other references · 18
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
- 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
- 2017Axiomatic Attribution for Deep Networkscited by 3,384
- 2023WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agentscited by 2,006
- 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,947
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2024τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domainscited by 1,402
- 2023Gorilla: Large Language Model Connected with Massive APIscited by 1,332
- 2024OSWorld: Benchmarking Multimodal Agents for Open-Ended Tasks in Real Computer Environmentscited by 1,195
- 2025A-MEM: Agentic Memory for LLM Agentscited by 1,063
- 2025τ2-Bench: Evaluating Conversational Agents in a Dual-Control Environmentcited by 627
6 more
- 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 493
- 2024WorkArena: How Capable Are Web Agents at Solving Common Knowledge Work Tasks?cited by 363
- 2024ToolSandbox: A Stateful, Conversational, Interactive Evaluation Benchmark for LLM Tool Use Capabilitiescited by 295
- 2025ACEBench: Who Wins the Match Point in Tool Usage?cited by 71
- 2025Rethinking Stateful Tool Use in Multi-Turn Dialogues: Benchmarks and Challengescited by 12
- 2024Evaluating the Correctness of Inference Patterns Used by LLMs for Judgmentcited by 1
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 12.
12 papers.
- 2026When Stale Constraints Go Unchecked: Budgeted Verification Failures in Inherited Agent Memorycited by 3
- 2026Correct Is Not Governed: Provenance Integrity in Agentic Workflowscited by 2
- 2026ResidualAuth: What Authorization State Must Language Agents Preserve under Revocable Delegation?cited by 2
- 2026Influence Is Not Authority: When Causal Guardrail Signals Make Legitimate Tool Use Look Like an Attack in Tool-Using LLM Agentscited by 1
- 2026HANSARD: A Reference Architecture for Forensic Readiness, Runtime Witnessing, and Graded Attribution in Autonomous Multi-Agent AI Systemscited by 0
- 2026Causal Attribution for Agentic Decisions: Estimators, Coupling, and a Traceability Specificationcited by 0
- 2026Do AI Coding Assistants Check Before They Install? A Pre-Registered Demand-Side Audit of Trust Signals in the Research Software Supply Chaincited by 0
- 2026Record Grouping Controls Evidence Weight in Language Modelscited by 0
- 2026Same Winners, Different Success Rates: Evaluating How LLM Agents Recover from Failurescited by 0
- 2026Blocking at the Boundary: Auditing Long-Horizon Agents against Staged Prompt Injectioncited by 0
- 2026Copies or Sources? Measuring How LLM Aggregators Count Restated Evidence in Multi-Agent Systemscited by 0
- 2026Prior or Feedback? What an LLM Uses When Adapting Neural Operatorscited by 0
- 2026Prior or Feedback? What an LLM Uses When Adapting Neural Operators8 Oct 2026
- 2026Copies or Sources? Measuring How LLM Aggregators Count Restated Evidence in Multi-Agent Systems5 Oct 2026
- 2026Blocking at the Boundary: Auditing Long-Horizon Agents against Staged Prompt Injection4 Oct 2026
- 2026Same Winners, Different Success Rates: Evaluating How LLM Agents Recover from Failures28 Sep 2026
- 2026Record Grouping Controls Evidence Weight in Language Models8 Sep 2026
- 2026ResidualAuth: What Authorization State Must Language Agents Preserve under Revocable Delegation?8 Sep 2026
- 2026Do AI Coding Assistants Check Before They Install? A Pre-Registered Demand-Side Audit of Trust Signals in the Research Software Supply Chain7 Sep 2026
- 2026Causal Attribution for Agentic Decisions: Estimators, Coupling, and a Traceability Specification6 Sep 2026
- 2026Influence Is Not Authority: When Causal Guardrail Signals Make Legitimate Tool Use Look Like an Attack in Tool-Using LLM Agents30 Aug 2026
- 2026When Stale Constraints Go Unchecked: Budgeted Verification Failures in Inherited Agent Memory26 Aug 2026
- 2026HANSARD: A Reference Architecture for Forensic Readiness, Runtime Witnessing, and Graded Attribution in Autonomous Multi-Agent AI Systems23 Aug 2026
- 2026Correct Is Not Governed: Provenance Integrity in Agentic Workflows13 Aug 2026
Similar, not cited
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- 2026READER: Dynamic LLM Provenance from Query-Varying Interactions
- 2026PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents
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- 2026When Tool Outputs Become Commands: Separating Action Induction from Runtime Authorization in Tool-Augmented LLM Agents
- 2026When Agents Overtrust Environmental Evidence: An Extensible Agentic Framework for Benchmarking Evidence-Grounding Defects in LLM Agents