Deontic Policies for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systems
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Autonomous agentic AI systems driven by Large Language Models (LLMs) introduce a new class of security, privacy, and compliance challenges: an agent that can invoke tools, manipulate data, install software, and coordinate with peer agents across organizational boundaries must be constrained not just by authentication and access control, but by the full structure of enterprise governance. This includes specifying what agents are permitted and prohibited from doing, what they areobliged to do after certain actions (e.g., notify the CISO), under what conditions a standing obligation may be waived, and which rules take precedence when policies conflict. This governance problem exceeds what current policy engines provide. Systems such as XACML, Rego, and Cedar address only the permit/prohibit subset of this governance structure. They do not provide obligation lifecycle management, meta-policy conflict resolution, dispensations that waive obligations in specific circumstances, and ontological reasoning over domain class hierarchies commonly found in applications such as healthcare, cybersecurity, or data privacy. We propose AgenticRei, which realizes key governance requirements such as obligations, dispensations, policy conflict resolutions, and reasoning over policies, as well as the basic permit/prohibit constraints. We use a deontic policy language built on the Rei framework, expressed as OWL (Web Ontology Language) and evaluated at runtime by a high-performance logic engine entirely outside the LLM. The same pipeline governs both tool invocations by the agent and agent-to-agent messages. We show through examples that deontic policies capture governance constraints around security and privacy that mostly cannot be expressed in current production engines. Our approach composes naturally with industry-standard frameworks like A2AS.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 15 of its 79 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Jun 2026.
Builds on
15 of 79 references.
Closest ancestors · 10
Same direction, newest first
- 2026From Governance Norms to Enforceable Controls: A Layered Translation Method for Runtime Guardrails in Agentic AI6 Apr
- 2026Agent-Fence: Mapping Security Vulnerabilities Across Deep Research Agents7 Feb
- 2026Taming Various Privilege Escalation in LLM-Based Agent Systems: A Mandatory Access Control Framework17 Jan
- 2025A2AS: Agentic AI Runtime Security and Self-Defense8 Oct
- 2025VeriGuard: Enhancing LLM Agent Safety via Verified Code Generation3 Oct
- 2025SAGA: A Security Architecture for Governing AI Agentic Systems27 Apr
- 2025ShieldAgent: Shielding Agents via Verifiable Safety Policy Reasoning26 Mar
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
Other references · 5
- 2024AI Agents Under Threat: A Survey of Key Security Challenges and Future Pathwayscited by 127
- 2025Authenticated Delegation and Authorized AI Agentscited by 65
- 2024Cedar: A New Language for Expressive, Fast, Safe, and Analyzable Authorization (Extended Version)cited by 34
- 2025Policy-as-Prompt: Turning AI Governance Rules into Guardrails for AI Agentscited by 14
- 2025Autonomous Agents and Policy Compliance: A Framework for Reasoning About Penaltiescited by 2
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 5.
5 papers.
- 2026Are You Still the Agent I Authorized? Earned Authority under a Fixed Ceiling for Evolving Agentscited by 5
- 2026Where Reliability Lives: Experimental Localisation of Behavioural Properties in an Agent Systemcited by 0
- 2026How Strongly Should Task State Influence an LLM Agent?cited by 0
- 2026From Agent Output to Authorized Transitioncited by 0
- 2026Subjects, Not Authors: The Authorship Hazard in Agentic Dataspacescited by 0
- 2026Subjects, Not Authors: The Authorship Hazard in Agentic Dataspaces24 Sep 2026
- 2026From Agent Output to Authorized Transition23 Sep 2026
- 2026How Strongly Should Task State Influence an LLM Agent?22 Sep 2026
- 2026Where Reliability Lives: Experimental Localisation of Behavioural Properties in an Agent System2 Sep 2026
- 2026Are You Still the Agent I Authorized? Earned Authority under a Fixed Ceiling for Evolving Agents26 Jul 2026
Similar, not cited
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- 2026Runtime Governance for AI Agents: Policies on Paths
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- 2026A Five-Plane Reference Architecture for Runtime Governance of Production AI Agents
- 2026A Unified Policy Architecture (UPA): The Governance Kernel for Enterprise AI Operating Systems
- 2025AGENTSAFE: A Unified Framework for Ethical Assurance and Governance in Agentic AI
- 2026SARC: A Governance-by-Architecture Framework for Agentic AI Systems
- 2026Overlaying Governance: A Compositional Authorization Framework for Delegation and Scope in Agentic AI