OpenART: Scaling Agent Red Teaming via Open-Ended Environment Evolution
On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security
Abstract (arXiv)
AI agents operate in persistent environments where early state changes can influence decisions far into the future. Unlike conventional language-model interactions, agent behavior is mediated through a shared state that is repeatedly modified and reused across long-horizon workflows. Current safety benchmarks often fail to capture these cumulative risks because they focus on short, static tasks. To address these limitations, we introduce OpenART, an open-ended arena for scalable agent red teaming through environment evolution. OpenART provides over 10,000 validated stateful scenarios across 50 domains, drawing from a pool of more than 500,000 tools and skills. These tasks require a median of 97 tool calls and enable unified evaluation across 75 different agent-model configurations. To systematically explore these evolving attack surfaces, we propose the Evolutionary Markov Hypergraph Attack (EMHA). EMHA is a black-box policy that performs feedback-driven environment evolution by coordinating authorized state transitions without requiring parameter updates. Throughout the evaluation, task objectives remain fixed while only the environment state changes. Across all configurations, EMHA achieves a pooled Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 85.0%. Its advantage over instruction-only evolution increases from approximately 2% on simple environments to over 17% on the most complex ones, demonstrating that environment evolution increasingly exposes safety failures as task complexity grows. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the specific runtime implementation of an agent explains a significant portion of safety variation beyond the underlying model's capabilities. These results establish OpenART as a scalable foundation for studying agent safety in complex, evolving environments. Code is avaible: https://github.com/AI45Lab/OpenART#
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 32 of its 88 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Aug 2026.
Builds on
32 of 88 references.
Closest ancestors · 13
Same direction, newest first
- 2026NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations11 Jul
- 2026AgentRedBench: Dynamic Redteaming and Integration-Aware Defense for LLM Agents over SaaS Integrations1 Jun
- 2026AgentSecBench: Measuring Prompt Injection, Privacy Leakage, and Tool-Use Integrity in LLM Agents25 May
- 2026DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap): A Controllable and Interactive Red-Teaming Platform for AI Agents6 May
- 2026ClawSafety: "Safe" LLMs, Unsafe Agents1 Apr
- 2026Learning to Inject: Automated Prompt Injection via Reinforcement Learning5 Feb
- 2026AgentDoG: A Diagnostic Guardrail Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security26 Jan
- 2026OpenRT: An Open-Source Red Teaming Framework for Multimodal LLMs4 Jan
- 2025MemoryGraft: Persistent Compromise of LLM Agents via Poisoned Experience Retrieval18 Dec
- 2025Evolve the Method, Not the Prompts: Evolutionary Synthesis of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs16 Nov
- 2025SafeArena: Evaluating the Safety of Autonomous Web Agents6 Mar
- 2024AdvAgent: Controllable Blackbox Red-teaming on Web Agents22 Oct
1 more
Other references · 19
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
- 2024τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domainscited by 1,402
- 2015Illuminating search spaces by mapping elitescited by 425
- 2024WorkArena: How Capable Are Web Agents at Solving Common Knowledge Work Tasks?cited by 363
- 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agentscited by 288
- 2025X-Teaming: Multi-Turn Jailbreaks and Defenses with Adaptive Multi-Agentscited by 125
- 2023AutoDAN: Interpretable Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 111
- 2025Safety at Scale: A Comprehensive Survey of Large Model and Agent Safetycited by 67
- 2026AgentDyn: Are Your Agent Security Defenses Deployable in Real-World Dynamic Environments?cited by 59
- 2026SkillNet: Create, Evaluate, and Connect AI Skillscited by 53
- 2026Memory Poisoning Attack and Defense on Memory Based LLM-Agentscited by 44
- 2026OSWorld 2.0: Benchmarking Computer Use Agents on Long-Horizon Real-World Taskscited by 40
7 more
- 2026AgentLAB: Benchmarking LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Attackscited by 39
- 2026From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agentscited by 33
- 2026Poison Once, Exploit Forever: Environment-Injected Memory Poisoning Attacks on Web Agentscited by 24
- 2026SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfacescited by 19
- 2026AgentHazard: A Benchmark for Evaluating Harmful Behavior in Computer-Use Agentscited by 18
- 2024Athena: Safe Autonomous Agents with Verbal Contrastive Learningcited by 5
- 2026GuardianAgentBench: Where Agents Fail and How to Guard Themcited by 4
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- 2026Proteus: A Self-Evolving Red Team for Agent Skill Ecosystems
- 2026Redefining AI Red Teaming in the Agentic Era: From Weeks to Hours
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- 2026REDAgentBench: Executable Red Teaming and Faithful Measurement of LLM Agent Systems