mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

AgentTrust: Runtime Safety Evaluation and Interception for AI Agent Tool Use

arXiv 2605.04785 ↗First posted 6 May 2026cs.AI cs.CRcited by 3

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Modern AI agents execute real-world side effects through tool calls such as file operations, shell commands, HTTP requests, and database queries. A single unsafe action, including accidental deletion, credential exposure, or data exfiltration, can cause irreversible harm. Existing defenses are incomplete: post-hoc benchmarks measure behavior after execution, static guardrails miss obfuscation and multi-step context, and infrastructure sandboxes constrain where code runs without understanding what an action means. We present AgentTrust, a runtime safety layer that intercepts agent tool calls before execution and returns a structured verdict: allow, warn, block, or review. AgentTrust combines a shell deobfuscation normalizer, SafeFix suggestions for safer alternatives, RiskChain detection for multi-step attack chains, and a cache-aware LLM-as-Judge for ambiguous inputs. We release a 300-scenario benchmark across six risk categories and an additional 630 independently constructed real-world adversarial scenarios. On the internal benchmark, the production-only ruleset achieves 95.0% verdict accuracy and 73.7% risk-level accuracy at low-millisecond end-to-end latency. On the 630-scenario benchmark, evaluated under a patched ruleset and not claimed as zero-shot, AgentTrust achieves 96.7% verdict accuracy, including about 93% on shell-obfuscated payloads. AgentTrust is released under the AGPL-3.0 license and provides a Model Context Protocol server for MCP-compatible agents.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 12 of its 33 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 May 2026.

Builds on

12 of 33 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
  2. 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents18 Jan
  3. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 9

  1. 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,393
  2. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
  3. 2023G-Eval: NLG Evaluation using GPT-4 with Better Human Alignmentcited by 2,205
  4. 2018Datasheets for Datasetscited by 1,371
  5. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  6. 2023AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agentscited by 1,211
  7. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,124
  8. 2024Prometheus 2: An Open Source Language Model Specialized in Evaluating Other Language Modelscited by 431
  9. 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 347

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.

3 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026AgentWall: A Runtime Safety Layer for Local AI Agents
  2. 2026AgenTRIM: Tool Risk Mitigation for Agentic AI
  3. 2026Agent Safety Should Be a Runtime Contract
  4. 2026SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents
  5. 2025OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety
  6. 2026ActBench: Self-Evolving Benchmark of Behavioral Safety in Cowork Agents
  7. 2026MalSkillBench: A Runtime-Verified Benchmark of Malicious Agent Skills
  8. 2025AgentGuard: Repurposing Agentic Orchestrator for Safety Evaluation of Tool Orchestration