Enforcing Benign Trajectories: A Behavioral Firewall for Structured-Workflow AI Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Structured-workflow agents driven by large language models execute tool calls against sensitive external environments. We propose codename, a telemetry-driven behavioral anomaly detection firewall. Drawing on sequence-based intrusion detection, codename compiles verified benign tool-call telemetry into a parameterized deterministic finite automaton (pDFA). The model defines permitted tool sequences, sequential contexts, and parameter bounds. At runtime, a lightweight gateway enforces these boundaries via an O(1) state-transition structural lookup, shifting computationally expensive analysis entirely offline. Evaluated on the Agent Security Bench (ASB), codename achieves a 5.6% macro-averaged attack success rate (ASR) across five scenarios. Within three structured workflows, ASR drops to 2.2%, outperforming Aegis, a state-of-the-art stateless scanner, at 12.8%. codename achieves 0% ASR on multi-step and context-sequential attacks in structured settings. Furthermore, against 1,000 algorithmically spliced exfiltration payloads, only 1.4% matched valid structural paths, all of which failed end-to-end string parameter guards (0 successes out of 14 surviving paths, 95% CI [0%, 23.2%]). codename introduces just 2.2~ms of per-call latency (a 3.7× speedup over textscAegis) while maintaining a 2.0% benign task failure rate (BTFR) on benign workloads. Modeling the behavioral trajectory effectively collapses the available attack surface, but unmaintained continuous parameter bounds remain vulnerable to synonym-substitution attacks (18% evasion rate). Thus, exact-match whitelisting of sensitive parameters ultimately bears the final defensive load against execution.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 15 of its 25 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Apr 2026.
Builds on
15 of 25 references.
Closest ancestors · 6
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Trajectory Guard -- A Lightweight, Sequence-Aware Model for Real-Time Anomaly Detection in Agentic AI2 Jan
- 2025Agentic AI Security: Threats, Defenses, Evaluation, and Open Challenges27 Oct
- 2025PromptArmor: Simple yet Effective Prompt Injection Defenses21 Jul
- 2025From Prompt Injections to Protocol Exploits: Threats in LLM-Powered AI Agents Workflows29 Jun
- 2025Firewalls to Secure Dynamic LLM Agentic Networks3 Feb
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
Other references · 9
- 2019Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networkscited by 9,049
- 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,880
- 2019Is BERT Really Robust? A Strong Baseline for Natural Language Attack on Text Classification and Entailmentcited by 663
- 2025Model Context Protocol (MCP): Landscape, Security Threats, and Future Research Directionscited by 257
- 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 108
- 2025Attack and defense techniques in large language models: A survey and new perspectivescited by 13
- 2026AEGIS: No Tool Call Left Unchecked -- A Pre-Execution Firewall and Audit Layer for AI Agentscited by 7
- 2025Are Agents Probabilistic Automata? A Trace-Based, Memory-Constrained Theory of Agentic AIcited by 1
- 2026AegisUI: Behavioral Anomaly Detection for Structured User Interface Protocols in AI Agent Systemscited by 1
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.
3 papers.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
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- 2026ChainFuzzer: Greybox Fuzzing for Workflow-Level Multi-Tool Vulnerabilities in LLM Agents
- 2026Comment and Control: Hijacking Agentic Workflows via Context-Grounded Evolution
- 2026Token-Flow Firewall: Semantic Runtime Auditing for Persistent AI Agents
- 2026CHASE: LLM Agents for Dissecting Malicious PyPI Packages
- 2026Authenticated Workflows: A Systems Approach to Protecting Agentic AI