Skynet: Workflow-Level Anomaly Detection for Agentic AI via Semantic and Structural Modeling
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Software engineering coding agents
Abstract (arXiv)
Agentic AI systems execute complex tasks through long-horizon workflows of planning, tool use, and multi-agent coordination. Task failures in these systems often originate from a single step, such as an injected prompt or a flawed plan, and are then amplified through downstream dependencies as the corrupted step propagates across many subsequent agents and tool calls. Existing defenses either target a specific class of attacks or failures, or inspect individual prompts and steps in isolation. Both leave the global dependency structure of a workflow unexamined, and miss the inconsistencies that only emerge when the execution is viewed as a whole. We argue that anomaly detection for agentic AI must reason at the workflow level, where global execution structure exposes signals that local checks cannot see. We present Skynet, a principled workflow-level anomaly detection framework that turns observed multi-agent execution into directed workflow graphs and scores them against learned benign behavior. Skynet jointly models the semantic execution context and the structural organization of inter-agent delegation, tool invocation, and data-flow dependencies, and trains only on benign workflows. Because training never sees attacks or failures, this design naturally extends to zero-day detection: any execution that violates benign workflow regularities surfaces as off-manifold geometry under a single decision rule. We evaluate Skynet on three public agentic safety and failure benchmarks. It sustains high recall together with a sub-1% false positive rate, with per-workflow and per-step latencies low enough for online monitoring of agentic AI runtimes.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Software engineering coding agents, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 34 of its 55 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 Sep 2026.
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