AEGIS: No Tool Call Left Unchecked -- A Pre-Execution Firewall and Audit Layer for AI Agents
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Abstract (arXiv)
AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.
Key facts. Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 13 Mar 2026.
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 7.
7 papers.
- 2026Auditable Agentscited by 14
- 2026Benign in Isolation, Harmful in Composition: Security Risks in Agent Skill Ecosystemscited by 9
- 2026Reason Less, Verify More: Deterministic Gates Recover a Silent Policy-Violation Failure Mode in Tool-Using LLM Agentscited by 8
- 2026AgentLTL: A Trace-Verification Framework for Measuring, Enforcing, and Training Procedural Compliance in Tool-Using LLM Agentscited by 4
- 2026Enforcing Benign Trajectories: A Behavioral Firewall for Structured-Workflow AI Agentscited by 3
- 2026When the Agent Is the Adversary: Architectural Requirements for Agentic AI Containment After the April 2026 Frontier Model Escapecited by 1
- 2026Janus: Evidence-Before-Effect Sagas and Offline-Verifiable Provenance for Agentic LLMscited by 0
- 2026Janus: Evidence-Before-Effect Sagas and Offline-Verifiable Provenance for Agentic LLMs29 Sep 2026
- 2026Reason Less, Verify More: Deterministic Gates Recover a Silent Policy-Violation Failure Mode in Tool-Using LLM Agents8 Jul 2026
- 2026AgentLTL: A Trace-Verification Framework for Measuring, Enforcing, and Training Procedural Compliance in Tool-Using LLM Agents1 Jul 2026
- 2026Benign in Isolation, Harmful in Composition: Security Risks in Agent Skill Ecosystems13 Jun 2026
- 2026Enforcing Benign Trajectories: A Behavioral Firewall for Structured-Workflow AI Agents29 Apr 2026
- 2026When the Agent Is the Adversary: Architectural Requirements for Agentic AI Containment After the April 2026 Frontier Model Escape25 Apr 2026
- 2026Auditable Agents7 Apr 2026