mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Token-Flow Firewall: Semantic Runtime Auditing for Persistent AI Agents

arXiv 2607.08395 ↗First posted 9 Jul 2026cs.CR cs.CLcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Persistent AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) beyond single-turn interaction into long-lived software systems. Unlike traditional chat assistants, unsafe content in these agents can propagate through persistent state, reusable skills, and tool-mediated interactions, creating a substantially larger semantic attack surface. We observe that most security-critical interactions in such agents are transmitted through natural-language token flows, including memory updates, tool arguments, retrieved files, and inter-component communications. This observation enables a new security formulation: unsafe behavior can be intercepted as risky semantic flows before reaching privileged runtime sinks. Based on this insight, we propose TokenWall, a runtime defense framework that acts as a semantic firewall over agent token flows. TokenWall performs boundary-aware semantic auditing over these flows, constructing structured source-sink audit records, applying lightweight local inspection before execution, and selectively escalating ambiguous high-risk cases to stronger arbitration modules. Unlike prior approaches that rely on sparse auditing or remote large-model oversight, TokenWall enables full-coverage pre-execution mediation while reducing remote arbitration and latency. Experiments on CIK-Bench show that TokenWall reduces attack success rate to 12.5% while maintaining a 97.4% benign executable pass rate without human confirmation. TokenWall further introduces only 0.69 seconds of additional latency on benign cases, demonstrating that semantic runtime containment can achieve a practical security-utility trade-off for persistent AI agents.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 19 of its 33 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Jul 2026.

Builds on

19 of 33 references.

Closest ancestors · 8

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Toward Securing AI Agents Like Operating Systems14 May
  2. 2026Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw6 Apr
  3. 2026Agent-Sentry: Bounding LLM Agents via Execution Provenance24 Mar
  4. 2026OpenClaw PRISM: A Zero-Fork, Defense-in-Depth Runtime Security Layer for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents12 Mar
  5. 2025LlamaFirewall: An open source guardrail system for building secure AI agents6 May
  6. 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents19 Dec
  7. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
  8. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 11

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
  2. 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
  3. 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
  4. 2023G-Eval: NLG Evaluation using GPT-4 with Better Human Alignmentcited by 2,276
  5. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
  6. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,207
  7. 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 605
  8. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 493
  9. 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 375
  10. 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 365
  11. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 267

Built on by

Not cited yet.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Agent-Fence: Mapping Security Vulnerabilities Across Deep Research Agents
  2. 2026AgentVisor: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection via Semantic Virtualization
  3. 2026AgentWall: A Runtime Safety Layer for Local AI Agents
  4. 2025SIEVE: Selective Integrity Verification and Escalation for Defending LLM Agents against Indirect Prompt Injection
  5. 2026SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents
  6. 2025Firewalls to Secure Dynamic LLM Agentic Networks
  7. 2026Blocking at the Boundary: Auditing Long-Horizon Agents against Staged Prompt Injection
  8. 2026Control-Token Injection Suppresses Chain-of-Thought and Defeats Reasoning-Based Oversight in Tool-Using Agents