Measuring the Permission Gate: A Stress-Test Evaluation of Claude Code's Auto Mode
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Claude Code's auto mode is the first deployed permission system for AI coding agents, using a two-stage transcript classifier to gate dangerous tool calls. Anthropic reports a 0.4% false positive rate and 17% false negative rate on production traffic. We present the first independent evaluation of this system on deliberately ambiguous authorization scenarios, i.e., tasks where the user's intent is clear but the target scope, blast radius, or risk level is underspecified. Using AmPermBench, a 128-prompt benchmark spanning four DevOps task families and three controlled ambiguity axes, we evaluate 253 state-changing actions at the individual action level against oracle ground truth. Our findings characterize auto mode's scope-escalation coverage under this stress-test workload. The end-to-end false negative rate is 81.0% (95% CI: 73.8%-87.4%), substantially higher than the 17% reported on production traffic, reflecting a fundamentally different workload rather than a contradiction. Notably, 36.8% of all state-changing actions fall outside the classifier's scope via Tier 2 (in-project file edits), contributing to the elevated end-to-end FNR. Even restricting to the 160 actions the classifier actually evaluates (Tier 3), the FNR remains 70.3%, while the FPR rises to 31.9%. The Tier 2 coverage gap is most pronounced on artifact cleanup (92.9% FNR), where agents naturally fall back to editing state files when the expected CLI is unavailable. These results highlight a coverage boundary worth examining: auto mode assumes dangerous actions transit the shell, but agents routinely achieve equivalent effects through file edits that the classifier does not evaluate.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 7 of its 16 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Apr 2026.
Builds on
7 of 16 references.
Closest ancestors · 4
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Agentic AI Security: Threats, Defenses, Evaluation, and Open Challenges27 Oct
- 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents19 Dec
Other references · 3
- 2025SafeToolBench: Pioneering a Prospective Benchmark to Evaluating Tool Utilization Safety in LLMscited by 22
- 2024Preemptive Detection and Correction of Misaligned Actions in LLM Agentscited by 10
- 2026AEGIS: No Tool Call Left Unchecked -- A Pre-Execution Firewall and Audit Layer for AI Agentscited by 8
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 10.
10 papers.
- 2026Overeager Coding Agents: Measuring Out-of-Scope Actions on Benign Taskscited by 13
- 2026Agentic Agile-V: From Vibe Coding to Verified Engineering in Software and Hardware Developmentcited by 2
- 2026CAGE: Certified Authorization under Typed-Return Uncertainty for Tool-Using Agentscited by 1
- 2026SteerBench-Work: A Benchmark for Agent Steering at Action Boundariescited by 1
- 2026AI Snitches Get Glitches: Towards Evading Agentic Surveillancecited by 0
- 2026Task-Conditioned Least-Privilege Learning for Executable Terminal and MCP Agentscited by 0
- 2026Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?cited by 0
- 2026Approval Laundering: Systematizing Approval--Execution Binding Failures in AI Coding-Agent Harnessescited by 0
- 2026Pincer: Resource Authorization for Agents using a Digital Twincited by 0
- 2026AuthGateBench: Benchmarking LLMs as Authorization Gatecited by 0
- 2026AuthGateBench: Benchmarking LLMs as Authorization Gate12 Oct 2026
- 2026Pincer: Resource Authorization for Agents using a Digital Twin1 Oct 2026
- 2026Approval Laundering: Systematizing Approval--Execution Binding Failures in AI Coding-Agent Harnesses30 Sep 2026
- 2026Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?27 Aug 2026
- 2026Task-Conditioned Least-Privilege Learning for Executable Terminal and MCP Agents18 Aug 2026
- 2026SteerBench-Work: A Benchmark for Agent Steering at Action Boundaries12 Aug 2026
- 2026CAGE: Certified Authorization under Typed-Return Uncertainty for Tool-Using Agents31 Jul 2026
- 2026AI Snitches Get Glitches: Towards Evading Agentic Surveillance24 Jun 2026
- 2026Agentic Agile-V: From Vibe Coding to Verified Engineering in Software and Hardware Development19 May 2026
- 2026Overeager Coding Agents: Measuring Out-of-Scope Actions on Benign Tasks18 May 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
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- 2026Security in the Age of AI Teammates: An Empirical Study of Agentic Pull Requests on GitHub
- 2026AgentTrust: Runtime Safety Evaluation and Interception for AI Agent Tool Use
- 2026Dive into Claude Code: The Design Space of Today's and Future AI Agent Systems
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- 2026Red-Teaming Auto Mode: Improving Blocking Classifiers Against Malign Coding Agents