Task-Conditioned Least-Privilege Learning for Executable Terminal and MCP Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Tool-using large language-model agents can complete a task while exercising authority that the user did not grant or the task does not need, causing excess-authority errors. Traditional permission gating systems alone for validating agent environments are insufficient. We study whether post-training can teach a 4B-parameter model to choose task-conditioned authority in executable terminal and Model Context Protocol (MCP) environments to complement those measures. We propose a framework where each action is audited before execution and again from observed effects along six dimensions of risk. This auditing is conducted using deterministic verifiers that score completion, evidence, exact state, prohibited attempts, and safe success. In conjunction with predefined task-specific sufficient-authority envelopes, we determine task-specific excess privilege values for trajectories, which are then optimized for in post-training. We find that after training using this framework on Qwen3.5-4B over 1,500 tasks, the selected seed reaches 98.48% safe success across 2,896 evaluation episodes spanning all 500 held-out tasks, compared with 64.36% for the base policy, and reduces excess-authority error events from 4.56% to 0.79%. Furthermore, external tests show capability retention and prompt-directed improvement. A 400 task continuation study also found evidence of generalization, reducing excess-authority events by 6.99 percentage points while maintaining previous capabilities. We conclude learned restraint through least-privilege aware post-training is therefore useful as an additional control layer for tool-using agents in executable terminal and MCP environments, but it does not replace permission gates and sandboxing.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 15 of its 26 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 18 Aug 2026.
Builds on
15 of 26 references.
Closest ancestors · 3
Same direction, newest first
- 2026When Lower Privileges Suffice: Investigating Over-Privileged Tool Selection in LLM Agents18 Jun
- 2026Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?14 May
- 2026Measuring the Permission Gate: A Stress-Test Evaluation of Claude Code's Auto Mode4 Apr
Other references · 12
- 2024DeepSeekMath: Pushing the Limits of Mathematical Reasoning in Open Language Modelscited by 9,379
- 2023Efficient Memory Management for Large Language Model Serving with PagedAttentioncited by 5,944
- 2024SWE-agent: Agent-Computer Interfaces Enable Automated Software Engineeringcited by 1,737
- 2025Understanding R1-Zero-Like Training: A Critical Perspectivecited by 1,345
- 2024OpenHands: An Open Platform for AI Software Developers as Generalist Agentscited by 1,002
- 2025Does Reinforcement Learning Really Incentivize Reasoning Capacity in LLMs Beyond the Base Model?cited by 982
- 2023MetaTool Benchmark for Large Language Models: Deciding Whether to Use Tools and Which to Usecited by 217
- 2024Keeping LLMs Aligned After Fine-tuning: The Crucial Role of Prompt Templatescited by 96
- 2021Consequences of Misaligned AIcited by 80
- 2026FORTIS: Benchmarking Over-Privilege in Agent Skillscited by 13
- 2025Cross-model Transferability among Large Language Models on the Platonic Representations of Conceptscited by 12
- 2024The Perils of Optimizing Learned Reward Functions: Low Training Error Does Not Guarantee Low Regretcited by 6
Built on by
Not cited yet.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026STARS: Skill-Triggered Audit for Request-Conditioned Invocation Safety in Agent Systems
- 2026Policy-Verified Self-Training: Learning Agent Compliance from Verifiable Policy Rewards
- 2026What Makes a Good Terminal-Agent Benchmark Task: A Guideline for Adversarial, Difficult, and Legible Evaluation Design
- 2026Terminal-World: Scaling Terminal-Agent Environments via Agent Skills
- 2026RAISED: Self-Distillation for Robustness to Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
- 2026Beyond Task Completion: Training Capable and Safe Computer-Use Agents
- 2026Towards Reliable Local Security Agents: Verifiable Post-Training for Linux Privilege Escalation
- 2026Optimizing Agent Planning for Security and Autonomy